

A Second Look at the Saudis

3. A Global Agenda

As we have seen, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia appears to have become a totalitarian theocracy, one geared toward indoctrinating an entire nation of Wahhabi ideologues. The call to wage jihad against the infidel is propagated throughout the Kingdom's basic social institutions by the authoritarian religious officials who control them. By far the most alarming consequence of this constant ideological indoctrination is the sheer number of young men who have heeded that call. As we saw in Part 1, the Kingdom's own intelligence service has estimated that 25,000 Saudi nationals received paramilitary training and/or experience abroad prior to September 11.¹ Others have estimated that number to be even higher.² These fanatical young men have filled the ranks of both Al Qaeda, and the broader mujahideen campaigns in such jihadist hotspots as Chechnya, Bosnia, Sudan and Algeria. However, this is only one part of a much larger story.

Financial Jihad

Not content to indoctrinate their own, the Saudis are also spending billions in petrodollars to spread their vicious ideology throughout the Muslim world. And the scope of this effort is truly staggering. David Aufhauser, the former general counsel of the U.S. Treasury Department, testified before the U.S. Senate that Saudi Arabia has spent "north of \$75 billion" to export Wahhabism around the world, mostly through Saudi-based Islamic charities.³ The Saudi government news weekly *Ain-al-Yaqeen* echoed that estimate, reporting that the Kingdom had spent more than \$70 billion "to spread Islam to every corner of the earth."⁴ One analyst has described the Saudi missionary program as "the largest worldwide propaganda campaign ever mounted," surpassing even the expenditures of the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War.⁵ Indeed, no less an authority than Bernard Lewis has observed that oil revenues have "allowed the Saudis to spread this fanatical, destructive form of Islam all over the Muslim world and among the Muslims in the West. Without oil and the creation of the Saudi kingdom, Wahhabism would have remained a lunatic fringe."⁶

The ultimate motivation for such spending is, of course, the Wahhabi ideology itself. One of the Five Pillars of Islam established in the Koran requires that all Muslims give 2.5% of their income to charity. These donations are known as *zakat*.⁷ The amount of *zakat* donated in Saudi Arabia has been estimated to be around \$10 billion annually.⁸ Predictably, the Wahhabis have now co-opted this mainstream institution within Islam to promote jihadism. As noted in Part 2, the former Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz, promoted jihad as the highest calling of the Muslim faith. However, he also promoted "financial jihad" (*jihad bi-l-maal*) – the use of Saudi Arabia's financial resources to support those fighting to make Wahhabism the dominant creed in the Muslim world (and beyond).⁹ The principle is expounded in solicitations by Saudi charities, one of which declared that, "God equated martyrdom through JIHAD with supplying funds for the JIHAD effort. All contributions should be mailed to . . ."¹⁰ Another solicitation asserted that, "it is likely the most important . . . disbursement of Zakat in our times is on the jihad for God's cause."¹¹ Even Saudi grade school textbooks address this theme. For instance, a ninth-grade textbook teaches that:

Out of the principle of responsibility towards our Muslim brethren, our state has spared no effort . . . in saving the Muslims in Kashmir from the conspiracies that threaten the existence of a whole people. The Muslims in Kashmir expect much of their Muslim brethren, as the Kashmiri *Jihad* movements call upon the Muslim states to intensify their efforts to support them politically and economically.¹²

And a tenth-grade textbook justifies the Kingdom's financial support of the Intifada, teaching that, "Holy *Jihad* is the Muslims' path to the recovery of Palestine."¹³

Osama bin Laden himself has addressed the link between zakat and jihad directly on a number of occasions. For instance, during an interview with ABC News in December 1998, Bin Laden stated that, "Muslims and Muslim merchants, in particular, should give their zakat and their money in support of this state [the Taliban regime]."¹⁴ Of course, he made this statement when Al Qaeda itself was nestled safely in Afghanistan under the Taliban's protection. Bin Laden addressed the issue again in a videotaped statement filmed in January 2001. He proclaimed, "Deserve credit those traders and businessmen who give Zakat so that they can help arm that ill-equipped Lashkar [a jihadist group in Kashmir]."¹⁵ He took a more strategic perspective on the link between Saudi wealth and "financial jihad" in 1996, when he addressed those who would attack the oil fields of Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden cautioned, "I would like to alert my brothers, the Mujahideen, the sons of the nation, to protect this wealth and not include it in the battle as it is a great Islamic treasure and sizeable economic resource essential for the soon to be established Islamic state."¹⁶

And just as Wahhabism prescribes, this missionary effort includes not only conventional outreach programs, but also the use of terrorism and paramilitary insurgencies to overthrow moderate and democratic governments and replace them with theocratic states following the Saudi archetype. Indeed, in reviewing the campaign to spread the Wahhabi creed abroad, one finds again and again that the work of Saudi-based Islamic "charities," government emissaries and Wahhabi missionaries are consistently intertwined with the efforts of Al Qaeda operatives and Islamist insurgents. Extremist violence and hateful rhetoric invariably follow hand-in-hand with seemingly altruistic missionary and education programs. How these elements ultimately play out varies from place to place. In some locales, the Saudis and their minions appear to have engineered jihadist insurgencies from scratch. In others, they have supported or co-opted existing civil wars and insurrections, effectively pouring gasoline on an already burning fire. But the end results are always the same – terror and violence.

A Helping Hand

The process almost always begins with the apparent generosity and good will of Saudi benefactors, but the domineering agenda of Wahhabism soon reveals itself. *The Chicago Tribune* nicely summarized how the Wahhabi machine uses massive amounts of cash to establish footholds in vulnerable communities around the globe:

Billions of Saudi charitable dollars changed hands, with the money originating from a variety of sources, including the king himself, thousands of members of the royal family, numerous millionaires and millions of average Saudis. Most of these people donated for religious reasons, fulfilling the Islamic requirement that Muslims give 2.5 percent of their annual net worth to charity [*zakat*]. . . .

The Saudis would eventually help establish at least 1,500 mosques abroad. They would also aid 2,000 Islamic schools, sponsor summer camps for children,

supplement the salaries of many prayer leaders and spend millions of dollars on Muslim research centers and endowed teaching positions at some of the world's top universities, including Harvard and Oxford. . . .

And while the Saudis would insist that strings were not attached to their giving, some Muslim groups would think otherwise.

Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina would become upset when the Saudis tried to impose dress codes. The mosque in Northbrook, the Islamic Cultural Center of Greater Chicago, would reluctantly halt coed folk dancing in the basement, partly because of Saudi complaints. And the American Society of Muslims, the 1.5 million-member African-American group based in Chicago, would quit taking Saudi money because of unacceptable demands.

"They wanted to tell me what to teach in the schools and what to use as curriculum," recalled W. Deen Mohammed, the former head of the association. "Our leaders won't accept that."

Others would assail the Saudis for publishing hate-filled books. One religious encyclopedia, published by a Saudi charity, called Jews "humanity's enemies; they foment immorality in this world."¹⁷

As one U.S official confirmed to *Time* magazine, Saudi charities exact a price for new and improved mosques and community centers, "It's conditioned on the preaching of Wahhabism."¹⁸

In Part 2, we saw how the Saudi education system has played a central role in indoctrinating an entire generation of young men into a rabidly xenophobic ideology. A principal aim of the Wahhabi outreach effort is to project that same education system abroad, principally by funding boarding schools known as *madrassas* around the world. The PBS news program *Frontline* noted that this is a truly global operation, reporting that over the past few decades, "Saudi charities established hundreds of religious schools, or *madrassas*, from Malaysia to Uzbekistan, from the Sudan to Pakistan."¹⁹ By the mid-1990's it was estimated that over one million children had been educated in the Wahhabi curriculum outside Saudi Arabia.²⁰ And the doctrines of war-as-religion and the infidel-as-enemy are alive and well in these schools. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pointed out, these *madrassas* "aren't training people in mathematics or languages or sciences or whatever, humanities — they're training people to kill. They're training people to go out and kill innocent men, women, and children."²¹

What's more, the same Saudi-based charities that are building community centers one day are aiding and abetting Al Qaeda and other like-minded jihadists the next. While most Americans understand (correctly) that Saudi charities have been used to funnel money to Osama bin Laden, the mainstream media has generally glossed over the full significance of that connection. The conventional wisdom seems to be that the conduits for financing Al Qaeda are mysterious fly-by-night operations run by crafty and elusive ne'er-do-wells. In fact, this financial apparatus is led by the wealthiest and most well-connected members of Saudi society (as amply illustrated by the members of the "Golden Chain" discussed in Part 1). And among the Saudi-based charities surreptitiously funding Al Qaeda and the broader jihadist movement are the largest and most prominent Islamic charities in the world, including the Saudi Red Crescent,²² the Al Haramain Foundation, the International Islamic Relief Organization, and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth ("WAMY").²³

Moreover, not only have these organizations been responsible for financing a number of jihadist campaigns around the globe, they have also formed an integral part of the logistics and supply networks of these campaigns, as well – transporting weapons and foot soldiers directly to the front lines. As French terrorism expert Jean-Charles Brisard explained:

Saudi charities are present at every stage of terrorism. . . . In documents seized in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2002 during searches of Benevolence International Foundation offices, and obtained by the 9/11 families, charities appear as part of Al-Qaida, fully integrated in its organizational structure to the point of creating a symbiotic relationship with it, acting as umbrellas, safe houses and military bases for Al Qaida operatives.²⁴

U.S. News & World Report has seconded Brisard's assessment, reporting that, "As front organizations, the charities were ideal. Some provided safe houses, false identities, travel documents. Others offered arms and materiel. Nearly all dispensed sizable amounts of cash, according to the CIA, with little or no documentation."²⁵ And at one point, even Saudi officials were willing to concede this role. During the Bosnian conflict, *The New York Times* reported that, "Despite formal denials from the relief organizations, Saudi officials say an increasing amount of the charity on behalf of the Bosnians is now used to provide arms and logistical support for Arab volunteers."²⁶ The American equivalent of all this would be if the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the YMCA and Goodwill Industries were found to be actively exporting hatred and violence around the world.

In Part 1 we saw how U.S. authorities rolled up the Al Haramain Foundation, branch by branch, until the entire organization was declared a financial conduit of Al Qaeda by the U.S. Treasury Department. An equally striking example of the role Saudi-based charities have played is that of the International Islamic Relief Organization (the "IIRO"). Founded in 1978, the IIRO has been described as "the richest and most active Islamic charity in the world."²⁷ Its parent organization, the Muslim World League (the "MWL"), was founded in 1962 and, according to one authority, has since "functioned as the quasi-official religious missionary and propaganda arm of the Saudi Kingdom."²⁸ The direct link between the MWL and the Saudi government was clearly illustrated in March 1997, when the MWL's secretary general publicly praised King Fahd for the \$1.33 billion he had donated to the organization over the years.²⁹

Like many other Saudi-based charities, and like Al Qaeda itself, the IIRO has its roots in the Saudi-backed campaign to push the Soviets out of Afghanistan during the 1980's. The MWL was originally tasked with sponsoring the Palestinian jihadist Sheikh Abdullah Azzam (Osama bin Laden's predecessor and mentor) in leading the "Arab Afghan" mujahideen in that fight.³⁰ CIA veteran Robert Baer reports that the IIRO quickly became the primary tool for funneling money from the Kingdom to the jihadists in Afghanistan. He explained:

When Saudi Arabia decided to fund the Afghan moujahidin in the early 1980's, the IIRO proved a perfect fit, a money conduit and plausible denial rolled into one. If the IIRO was caught breaking some country's law, or one of its employees strayed and joined a terrorist group, Saudi Arabia could simply disclaim responsibility, a sleight of hand that has spared the royal family a lot of embarrassment over the years.³¹

The same *Tareekh Osama* file, discovered by Bosnian authorities in March 2002, which exposed the Golden Chain of Al Qaeda financiers also contained documents showing the extent of the IIRO's involvement in Afghanistan. In one memorandum on IIRO stationary, which

documented a meeting between future Al Qaeda operatives, the suggestion was made that IIRO offices be established in Pakistan for the express purpose that “attacks will be launched from them.”³² Another document, an official letter also on IIRO letterhead, suggested that jihadist volunteers use the IIRO and MWL as “an umbrella you can stay under.”³³

Once the Soviets had been driven out of Afghanistan, the IIRO quickly redirected its efforts to other jihadist hotspots, including the ethnic conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The IIRO began by funneling cash and “relief workers” to Bosnia to help in the defense of the besieged Muslims there.³⁴ Eventually, the organization would send weapons shipments to the front lines to help arm the Bosnian Muslims and foreign volunteers (hundreds of whom were Saudis themselves) who fought in the conflict.³⁵ And Serbian forces were soon finding humanitarian worker identifications cards issued by the IIRO office in Pakistan on the bodies of Saudi fighters killed on the battlefield.³⁶

By 1996, the relationship between the IIRO and global jihadism was beginning to become clear to U.S. intelligence officials. As *The Wall Street Journal* reported:

As early as 1996, the U.S. government possessed detailed information concerning terrorist penetration of Islamic charities world-wide, an intelligence report from that period shows. . . .

[The report] lists the Saudi-backed International Islamic Relief Organization, or IIRO, as having “extremist connections,” including to the Palestinian group Hamas, Algerian radicals, and the Egyptian precursor to al Qaeda, Al-Gamaat Al-Islamiya.

“The IIRO is affiliated with the Muslim World League, a major international organization largely financed by the government of Saudi Arabia,” the report states, connecting the IIRO to al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and convicted terrorist Ramzi Yousef. . . . Finally, it says, “the IIRO helps fund six militant training camps in Afghanistan, according to a clandestine source.”³⁷

On the last point, note that in congressional testimony in October 2003, Jean-Charles Brisard confirmed that the IIRO had “funded at least 6 training camps referred to as terrorist training camps by the US government, including the Darunta camp, a facility used for chemical and biological weapons testing.”³⁸ While the above report from 1996 may have attributed this pervasive behavior to “terrorist penetration” of the IIRO, as we’ve now seen there is a much more direct explanation. The agents of the IIRO were simply following the tenets of Saudi Arabia’s official state religion, Wahhabism, which they had learned over a lifetime of education.

The relationship between the IIRO and Al Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan was further illuminated by the capture of a Bangladeshi IIRO worker named Sayed Abu Nasir in 1999.³⁹ Nasir was arrested by Indian authorities after he was caught scouting targets for a terrorist attack on U.S. diplomatic offices in Madras and Calcutta. He had four pounds of explosives in his possession at the time.⁴⁰ Earlier, Nasir had worked for the director of IIRO operations in Asia, Sheikh Ahmed al-Gamdin.⁴¹ While at the IIRO, his superiors confided to him that between 40% and 50% of the IIRO’s funds were used to finance terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and Kashmir.⁴² Nasir himself was charged with the task of periodically visiting the camps to assess their financial needs.⁴³ Eventually, Shiekh Al-Gamdin instructed him to undergo military training at the camps, and he personally met with Osama bin Laden soon thereafter.⁴⁴

Over time, IIRO operations would stretch into Southeast Asia and Africa, as well. For instance, according to Philippine authorities, the IIRO office in Zamboanga City was the primary coordinating center for the Abu Sayyaf group, a local jihadist group seeking to form an autonomous Islamic state in the Philippines.⁴⁵ Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, a high-level Al Qaeda operative from Saudi Arabia, ran the IIRO office in the Philippines from 1988 to 1994 and used the charity to channel funds to like-minded radicals throughout Southeast Asia.⁴⁶ A brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden himself, Khalifa would go on to become one of Al Qaeda's most prolific members. Among other achievements, he has been named an unindicted coconspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing by the U.S. Justice Department, and has now been linked in federal court documents to the Bojinka plot – Al Qaeda's foiled attempt to bomb a dozen American airliners in mid-flight over the Pacific.⁴⁷ And Khalifa isn't the only member of the Bin Laden family involved with the IIRO. Back in Saudi Arabia, one of the more influential members on the IIRO board of directors was Tariq bin Laden, yet another of Osama's brothers.⁴⁸ In addition to the controversy in the Philippines, the IIRO office in Nairobi was deregistered in 1998 after Kenyan authorities discovered numerous connections between that office and the perpetrators of the African embassy bombings.⁴⁹

Looking over the IIRO's global track record, terrorism expert Mathew Epstein testified before congress, "In various war-torn parts of the Muslim world, from Bosnia to the Philippines, IIRO was used by Arab-Afghan mujahideen as a major conduit for smuggling money, men, and weapons to and from the combat zone."⁵⁰ Indeed, the IIRO's machinations have reached into the United States, as well. Its U.S. office was established by Sulaiman bin Ali al-Ali, a prominent Saudi businessman, in July 1991.⁵¹ Al-Ali is a member of the IIRO's executive committee, and a member of the Shura Council of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (a group of prominent advisors to the Saudi government).⁵² According to federal court documents, Al-Ali arrived in the United States with \$10 million dollars to invest on behalf of the IIRO.⁵³ However, things went downhill in a hurry. In January 1997, FBI agents raided the Virginia headquarters of the IIRO as part of an investigation into terrorist financing, money laundering and fraud.⁵⁴ In August 1998, as the investigation intensified, Al-Ali abruptly abandoned his residences in Virginia and California and returned to Saudi Arabia.⁵⁵ Investigators ultimately found that millions of dollars in IIRO funds designated for humanitarian causes were unaccounted for.⁵⁶ It was also discovered that Al-Ali had surreptitiously disbursed millions of dollars to fund "relief" efforts on the frontlines of such jihadist hotspots as Bosnia, Sudan and Israel.⁵⁷ Al-Ali remains in Saudi Arabia, a free man, to this day.⁵⁸

A State Sponsor

While this movement may be a grassroots effort at its base (just like Al Qaeda itself), the Saudi government has clearly taken a direct role in facilitating this ideological campaign. As the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (the "USCIRF") found in its 2005 annual report:

The Saudi government itself has been implicated in promoting and exporting views associated with certain Islamic militant and extremist organizations in several parts of the world, and a number of reports have identified members of extremist and militant groups that have been trained as clerics in Saudi Arabia.

...

The Saudi government funds mosques, university chairs, Islamic study centers, and religious schools known as madrassas all over the world. During

Afghanistan's war against the former Soviet Union, Saudi-funded madrassas were established in Pakistan that were concerned less with scholarship than implementing an extremist agenda. These madrassas provided ideological training for some of those who went to fight in Kashmir, Chechnya, and Afghanistan—and many of these schools still do. The peaceful propagation of religious beliefs, including Islam, is a human right. However, there is legitimate concern when a government may be propagating an ideology that promotes hatred and violence against both Muslims and non-Muslims.⁵⁹

This is truly a national effort, one in which both the public and private sectors of a totalitarian theocracy are devoting nearly bottomless financial resources to missionary activity.

Even the official diplomatic corps of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has played an active part in spreading Wahhabism. According to Mohammed al-Khilewi, a Saudi diplomat who defected to the U.S. because of the Kingdom's policies, "The Saudi government spends billions of dollars to establish cultural centers in the U.S. and all over the world. They use these centers to recruit individuals and to establish extreme organizations."⁶⁰ *The Washington Post* has provided further details on this effort:

[T]he Saudis created an Islamic affairs ministry in 1993 that was intended to be the key institution for exporting Wahhabism. The ministry, officially known as the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowment, Call and Guidance, is led by Saleh Sheik, a direct descendant of Ibn Abdul Wahab. . . .

The ministry's outreach is formidable. It pays the salaries of 3,884 Wahhabi missionaries and preachers, who are six times as numerous as the 650 diplomats in Saudi Arabia's 77 embassies. Ministry officials in Africa and Asia often have had more money to dispense than Saudi ambassadors, according to several Saudi sources. The Islamic affairs officials also act as religious commissars, keeping tabs on the moral behavior of the kingdom's diplomats. In the United States, a 40-person Islamic Affairs Department established in the Saudi Embassy in Washington became something of an independent body, with little supervision from the often absent ambassador, Prince Bandar bin Sultan.

Sheik estimated the Islamic affairs ministry's budget at \$530 million annually and said it goes almost entirely to pay the salaries of the more than 50,000 people on the ministry payroll.⁶¹

And the USCIRF has confirmed Al-Khilewi's revelation, as well. The Commission recounted:

It has been widely reported that Islamic affairs sections in Saudi embassies globally have been responsible for both distributing religious materials with inflammatory and hate-filled language toward non-Wahhabi religious groups and providing diplomatic status to Muslim clerics, even non-Saudi clerics, some of whom have been known to preach hate and intolerance of other religious communities.⁶²

In addition to these efforts, note that by one count the Saudi elite now wield control or influence over as much as 90% of Arabic language newspapers, magazines, publishing houses, radio and television.⁶³ Among its global media assets, the Saudi royal family is now the fourth-largest stakeholder of News Corp., the parent of Fox News.⁶⁴ The Saudi government also owns a \$130

million printing plant near Medina which has distributed 138 million copies of the Wahhabi Koran around the world.⁶⁵

While U.S. officials have consistently shown indifference to the activities of our oil-rich “allies” abroad, others have already begun to push back against the Wahhabi threat. Recounting his experiences as chairman of the National Security Council’s committee on terrorist financing, David Aufhauser testified before the USCIRF that, “more than one minister – prime minister – told me that they will not even let a Saudi cleric into their land anymore for fear that the preaching would be preaching of hate and revolt and violence rather than religion.”⁶⁶ Some of these ministers have already begun speaking out publicly. Hajj Salih Brandt, the Chechen government’s special envoy to Europe, has bluntly warned that, “the whole political agenda of Wahhabi Fundamentalism . . . is a deviation of Islam taught in Madinah University in Saudi Arabia, sponsored by the Saudi government and exported from there. . . . Out of it have come Hamas, the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, the FIS [in Algeria], Sudan, and now the gangs roaming Chechnya and Daghestan.”⁶⁷ Likewise, the former minister of education in Tunisia, Mohamed Charfi, wrote in *The New York Times*:

Osama bin Laden, like the 15 Saudis who participated in the criminal operations of September 11, seems to have been the pure product of his schooling. While Saudi Arabia is officially a moderate state allied with America, it also has been one of the main supporters of Islamic fundamentalism because of its financing of schools following the intransigent Wahhabi doctrine. Saudi backed madrassas in Pakistan and Afghanistan have played a significant role in the strengthening of radical Islam in those countries. . . .

Our hope is that young Tunisians, through a more secular education, can be brought up to value individual liberty and openness to others.⁶⁸

But to truly appreciate the gravity of the situation it is necessary to take a closer look, country by country, at the Wahhabi machine in action.

Full Court Press

Afghanistan: Saudi meddling in Afghanistan began with the direct support and approval of the United States. In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the U.S. and Saudi governments agreed to work together to undermine and drive out the Soviet occupiers. Financially, the U.S. agreed to match the Saudis dollar for dollar to finance this multi-billion dollar effort.⁶⁹ According to CIA veteran Robert Baer, the Saudis kicked in \$5.5 billion in 1981 alone.⁷⁰ Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz and Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz spearheaded the effort, contributing funds both directly and through the Muslim World League and IIRO.⁷¹ Eventually, Osama bin Laden entered the fight with the behind-the-scenes backing of the Saudi royal family. Indeed, in one interview Bin Laden explained that, “To counter these atheist Russians, the Saudis chose me as their representative in Afghanistan.”⁷²

However, the true impact of the Saudis wouldn’t be felt until after the Soviets had pulled out in 1989. Unlike the U.S., which was interested solely in thwarting Soviet aggression, the Saudis had much more ambitious plans for Afghanistan. Those plans would ultimately come to fruition with the rise of the Taliban. In a speech on the House floor just days after September 11, Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), who had served as the Reagan administration’s point man on Afghanistan, discussed his experience dealing with the Saudis in the wake of the Soviet pullout. He recounted that the Taliban was very much a creation of the Saudis:

I suggested to bring back the king of Afghanistan [King Zahir Shah] because he was a wonderful person and beloved by his people. He was a person who was a moderate in his approach and never killed other people. He, in fact, was truly a moderate and, I might say, pro-western or western oriented, although a devout Muslim. But the Saudis wanted nothing to do with bringing back a moderate good-hearted king from exile. They and their Pakistani allies were in the process of creating a secret third force that I did not know anything about: the Taliban. But during my conversation, it was mentioned that a third force was being created, one that could take over Afghanistan and bring stability, but, of course, one that would do the bidding of their Pakistani and Saudi handlers.

One must wonder why the Saudi Arabians and the Pakistanis are even to this day so involved in Afghanistan. This is an important fact of history that we need to understand. Number one, the type of religious fervor they have and the type of Islam they have in Saudi Arabia is very similar to that in Afghanistan. It is unbending and intolerant and they do not permit any other faith in their country.⁷³

International terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna has also observed that the Taliban regime bore a striking resemblance to the Wahhabi theocracy of Saudi Arabia. He wrote:

Meanwhile, the Saudi and Pakistani governments continued to aid [Bin Laden's] hosts, the Taliban. For instance, the Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal visited Kandahar and gave money to the Taliban in order to buy the loyalty of several opposition mujahidin commanders. On another occasion the Saudis donated 400 pickup trucks to the Taliban, which they arranged to have flown to Kandahar. . . .

As the Taliban enforced its writ, the agony of the people of Afghanistan increased. With the exception of a few doctors, women were denied education and employment, and had to wear the veil. Sexual intercourse outside of wedlock was punishable by 100 lashes or stoning to death; homosexuality was punishable by toppling a fifteen-foot brick wall on the guilty person with the aim of killing him; the hands and feet of thieves were amputated; television was banned, as were photography, singing, flying kites or playing or listening to music; prison was mandatory for those who failed to pray five times a day or did not fast for thirty days during Ramadan; Western hairstyles and the shaving or trimming of beards was outlawed, as were gambling, pigeon racing and dog racing. While these *hadd* punishments were not the Taliban's invention, having also been practiced in Saudi Arabia, they were carried out with especial zeal in Afghanistan.⁷⁴

Thus, the ultimate aim of the Taliban regime was to create a totalitarian theocracy even more suffocating than that of their Saudi masters.

As both Rohrabacher and Gutaratna note above, Pakistan also played a key role in the rise of the Taliban.⁷⁵ But as investigative journalist Gerald Posner has noted, it was the Saudis who were ultimately calling the shots. He reports that the Saudi royals were also funneling money directly to the Pakistanis, and specifically to radical elements of its intelligence agency (the "ISI"), to buy their loyalty and assistance in both organizing the Taliban and establishing Wahhabi *madrassas* inside Pakistan.⁷⁶ For the Pakistanis, the arrangement had two major benefits. It would allow them to keep their finger on developments in their neighbor to the north

(Afghanistan being an important strategic buffer with Iran), and it would help them acquire terrorist recruits from the madrassas for their operations in Kashmir.⁷⁷

With the aid of their Wahhabi benefactors, the Taliban did indeed manage to achieve a new level of viciousness and violence. Dana Rohrabacher continued on the House floor:

[A]ll too soon, the people of Afghanistan and the rest of the world were to discover that the Pakistanis and the Saudis had created a monster.

The Taliban were and are medieval in their words, in their world view, and their religious view. They are violent, they are intolerant, they are fanatics that are totally out of sync with Muslims throughout the world, even Muslims in their own country, and they are especially out of sync with Muslims living in the western democracies. . . .

The Taliban believe they have a private line to God, and the rest of us, with our religious constrictions are, according to the Taliban, we are not only wrong, but we are evil. That is why they have been willing to give safe haven to the likes of bin Laden, the Saudi terrorist who . . . has an army of several thousand gunmen who he has brought in from various parts of the world, so they are foreigners to the people of Afghanistan, and this group of gunmen have been running around Afghanistan like a pack of mad dogs killing anyone who is an enemy to Taliban power. These foreign religious fanatics have killed thousands of Afghans, so the Taliban and bin Laden are as despised in that country as they are in our country today.⁷⁸

Arriving at much the same conclusion, terrorism expert Dore Gold, who once served as the Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, further elucidated the religious motivations for the violence in Afghanistan. He observed:

Given the Saudis active support for the Taliban—which the Saudi religious leadership backed—it is little wonder that in the 1990s the Afghan rebels moved even closer to Wahhabism. . . .

As bin Laden gained influence, the Taliban's acts reflected radical Wahhabi ideas. Historically, Afghan Sunni Muslims had not attacked the Shiite Muslim minority, but anti-Shiite reprisals began even before the Taliban takeover and grew more systematic under the Taliban regime. Bin Laden's Wahhabi fighters helped the Taliban massacre the Hazaras, a Persian-speaking Shiite group living in northern Afghanistan. . . .

The Taliban essentially gave the Shiites three choices: convert to Sunni Islam, move to Iran, or be killed. Tens of thousands of Mazar-i-Sharif residents fled for their lives; the Taliban killed many of these refugees from the air. Between five and six thousand Shiites were killed in this Taliban campaign, according to United Nations and Red Cross sources.⁷⁹

The Taliban's persecution of Shiites was so aggressive that at one point they nearly provoked a war with Iran. In October 1998, Iran massed 200,000 troops at its eastern border and demanded the release of scores of Iranian citizens who had been taken prisoner during the Taliban's rampage.⁸⁰ Noting the Taliban's genocidal campaign against the Hazaras, Gold wryly concluded

that, “The Taliban came to follow the Wahhabi approach to Shiism, rather than the practice followed in other parts of the Islamic world.”⁸¹

The intimate relationship between the Saudis and the Taliban shouldn’t be surprising. After all, the term *Taliban* itself means “students”.⁸² And it’s not very difficult to figure out who the teachers are. Saudi funded madrassas in Pakistan were the key to the rise of the Taliban. These Islamic boarding schools have been described as “a supply line for jihad” and “jihad factories.”⁸³ One school in particular has drawn a significant amount of attention, the Haqqania Madrassa in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan. Haqqania has graduated more members of the Taliban’s leadership than any other madrassa, including the leader of the Taliban at the time of the September 11 attacks, Mullah Omar, and at least seven other Taliban ministers.⁸⁴ At one point, when the Taliban was faring badly against their principal rivals in Afghanistan – the Northern Alliance, Haqqania was shut down and its students were sent directly to the front lines.⁸⁵ Investigative journalist Jeffrey Goldberg visited the madrassa in July 2000. He found that many of the students were destitute, and in some cases the madrassa provided their last hope for a sense of family and security.⁸⁶ In an attempt to challenge the students and test their beliefs, he asked one student why they praised Osama bin Laden:

“Osama wants to keep Islam pure from the pollution of the infidels,” he said. “He believes Islam is the way for all the world. He wants to bring Islam to all the world.” . . .

I asked the students if they thought it would be permissible, by the law of Islam, to use a nuclear bomb during the prosecution of a jihad.

“All things come from Allah,” one student said. “The atomic bomb comes from Allah, so it should be used.”

I asked one final question, more out of self-interest than anything else: What would you do if you learned that the C.I.A. had captured bin Laden and was taking him to America to stand trial?

A student who gave his name as Muhammad stood up: “We would sacrifice our lives for Osama. We would kill Americans.”

What kind of Americans?

“All Americans.”⁸⁷

When *The New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman visited the same school a year later, he made a telling observation. On the wall of the school’s main classroom he saw a plaque declaring the facility “A Gift of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”⁸⁸

Algeria: The extreme violence in Algeria during the 1990’s began when veterans of the jihad in Afghanistan began returning home. They soon organized themselves into jihadist groups, two of the most prominent being the Islamic Salvation Front (the “FIS”) and the Armed Islamic Group (the “GIA”).⁸⁹ What began as skirmishes in the street eventually grew into one of the bloodiest campaigns of the Wahhabi movement. As *The Seattle Times* reported, the FIS “insisted Algeria be ruled by *shariah*, laws derived from strict interpretations of the Quran. Saudi Arabia had already embraced this fundamentalism — there it was called Wahhabism.”⁹⁰ Echoing the Wahhabi call for a return of the caliphate, one FIS pamphlet explained:

Crusader France and some of the leaders of unbelief and atheism are working to encircle the FIS leaders who are abroad to impose a political blockade on the voices calling for the right to the Umma and the building of an Islamic state on Algerian soil.⁹¹

Also noteworthy, the reference to the “crusader” West which is a hallmark of Wahhabi rhetoric, as pointed out in Part 2.⁹²

Once again, the Saudis played a direct role in financing the insurgency. One expert noted that, “The FIS got a head start over other opposition parties because it enjoyed an informal support network in the mosques and was bolstered by heavy funding from Islamists in Saudi Arabia.”⁹³ In fact, for decades international authorities have expressed concern about the flow of Saudi petrodollars to Algeria’s militants. When U.S. State Department officials first tried to get the Saudi government to stop individuals and charities from funding Algerian jihadists during the Reagan administration, Saudi officials snidely replied that, “they couldn’t tell Saudis where to put their money.”⁹⁴ In 1993, *The Washington Post* reported that the MWL had financed “institutions associated with Algeria’s Islamic movement.”⁹⁵ That same year, according to *The Financial Times*, “Charles Pasqua, the then French interior minister, also visited the Saudi capital to complain about the alleged funding by a number of Saudi businessmen of insurgents in Algeria.”⁹⁶ The response from the Saudi government appears to have been the same. Indeed, the U.S. intelligence report from 1996 discussed above would later document how the IIRO had been supporting Algerian radicals.⁹⁷

What’s more, Al Qaeda itself was directly involved in igniting the Algerian conflict. Rohan Gunaratna has reported that several hundred of the Algerian jihadists were initially trained in Al Qaeda’s camps, first in Afghanistan and later in Sudan.⁹⁸ In particular, veterans from the Saudi funded mujahideen in Afghanistan would form the backbone of one of the most vicious of the jihadist groups in the Algerian conflict, the GIA.⁹⁹ That group was tied to Saudi Arabia doctrinally, as well. As one reporter noted:

Saudi Arabia has meanwhile given scholarships to thousands of impoverished foreign Muslims to study at the Islamic University of Medina. Among Medina graduates are spiritual leaders of the *Groupe Islamique Armé* (GIA), Algerian Islamists who share Wahhabi ideology.¹⁰⁰

In addition, several Al Qaeda operatives are known to have smuggled weapons into Algeria, the most noteworthy of whom was Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, a Saudi national who would later lead Al Qaeda’s operations back home in the Kingdom.¹⁰¹

The Saudi sponsored insurrection in Algeria soon exploded into unspeakable brutality. Rohan Gunaratna described the carnage in explicit detail:

Although the campaign for an Islamic state was developed and nurtured by the FIS, the Islamist agenda was effectively hijacked by the GIA, which Al Qaeda soon infiltrated. . . . Formed in 1993 and led by Abdelhak Layada, the GIA waged the most brutal terrorist campaign yet seen in the Middle East, against not only the security forces but also ordinary Algerian Muslims.

The GIA constantly changed the nature of its campaign. It began in 1993 by killing diplomats, clergy, industrialists, intellectuals, feminists, journalists, priests and foreigners, but from 1996 murdered tens of thousand of innocent Algerians. . . . raiding parties slit the throats of their victims, including children; kidnapped

men and women, including young girls; and at times massacred entire village populations by hacking their victims with daggers, swords, axes and knives. Others were beheaded, beaten to death, or cut with chainsaws, and in these “abominable massacres” the mutilated victims often bled slowly to death. Those who attempted to flee were doused with gas and set on fire, and during some massacres the terrorist broke for lunch, demonstrating their macabre mind-set. . . .

On September 8, 1997, the GIA issued its infamous declaration justifying the massacres, stating that the Algerian people were “kaffirs [infidels], apostates and hypocrites because they did not support the GIA against the government.” Claiming responsibility for its excesses, including the forcible use of “temporary marriages” (*sabi*) and rape of women they captured, the GIA claimed that it was all “sacrificing for the cause of Allah.”¹⁰²

By one count, as many as 100,000 men, women and children were killed in the Algerian conflict between 1992 and 1997.¹⁰³ The irony is that the Wahhabis often refer to the West by the derogatory term *jahiliya*. This is a reference to the supposed state of savagery and barbarism that existed in the world before the rise of Islam. Yet looking at what the Wahhabis have wrought in Algeria, one can’t help but consider who the real savages are.

The Balkans: Just as in Afghanistan, the Saudis openly intervened in the defensive struggle of Bosnian and Kosovar Muslims against Serbian aggression in the Balkans, contributing both money and manpower to the fight. The Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz, called on all Islamic organizations to assist the Bosnian Muslims in their fight against the Christian Serbians – “the enemies of Allah.”¹⁰⁴ And on August 11, 1995, King Fahd himself sponsored a telethon on Saudi state TV which raised over \$100 million for the cause.¹⁰⁵ The IIRO, WAMY and the Benevolence International Foundation would each help foreign jihadists make their way to the front lines, and then flew wounded Saudi fighters to Germany for medical treatment.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, Saudi officials would openly admit that their charity fronts were providing weapons and financial backing to the Arab jihadists in Bosnia.¹⁰⁷

Saudi volunteers played a critical role in raising a contingent of foreign fighters to wage jihad against the Serbians. Indeed, the man who would ultimately organize and lead the thousands of foreign mujahideen who fought in Bosnia was Sheikh Abu Abdul Aziz (aka “Barbaros”), a Saudi national affiliated with Al Qaeda.¹⁰⁸ His *El-Muzhahidun* regiment was renowned for its viciousness, and made a practice of decapitating and mutilating the dead bodies of Christian Serbians (a calling card now on gruesome display in Iraq).¹⁰⁹ By December 1992, over 400 Saudi volunteers had already joined the fight.¹¹⁰ Among them was Al Qaeda operative Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, the same Saudi national who helped smuggle weapons into Algeria, who taught new jihadist recruits at a military training camp in the Balkans.¹¹¹ And one of Al Qaeda’s most widely distributed recruiting videos depicts the foreign jihadists fighting in Bosnia in 1993. The video featured the deaths of two Saudi fighters, Abu Zubair al-Madani (purportedly a cousin of Osama bin Laden) and Abu Abbas al-Madani, both of whom were well-known members of Al Qaeda.¹¹² Over two-dozen Saudis died in the conflict by the end of 1992 alone.¹¹³

However, local Muslims soon began to realize that the Saudis were interested in more than just pushing back the Serbian aggressors. As noted in Part 2, the social regime of the Wahhabis is all-encompassing and suffocating. Time and time again, Wahhabi “missionaries” have shown similar totalitarian proclivities as they attempt to engineer mirror-image societies

elsewhere. Dore Gold described this in detail in his discussion of Wahhabi activism in Bosnia and Kosovo:

The Saudi charities stayed active in the Balkans even when the postwar reconstruction efforts were under way, but the clash between the Saudi donors' Wahhabism and the Balkan recipients' form of Islam became ever more glaring. For example, Balkan mosques had been decorated according to centuries-old Ottoman traditions, with ornaments and other unique architectural features that were not used in the mosques of the Arabian peninsula. So when the leaders of the Saudi charities, who felt it was their mission to spread Wahhabism, financed the reconstruction of mosques damaged in the war, they were sure to remove the ornate decorations. While rebuilding the Gazi-Husrevbeg mosque in Sarajevo—considered one of the greatest Islamic structures in southeastern Europe—the Saudi agency overseeing the project plastered over centuries-old frescoes and ceramic tiles. In Kosovo, the Saudis even destroyed mosques, some of them from the five-hundred-year period during which the Ottoman Empire ruled Kosovo. In two notable cases, older mosques were dismantled and replaced with much larger concrete mosques that had no offensive ornamentation.

Thus, just as the Wahhabi-influenced Taliban destroyed Buddhist statues in Afghanistan's Bamiyan Valley, the Wahhabis in the Balkans had no problem tearing down the symbols of other cultures, no matter their archaeological or cultural value. But in this case, they were destroying *Islamic* culture.¹¹⁴

One Bosnian official would soon complain, "We have a big problem with the Saudis; they are spreading around huge amounts of money to help rebuild Bosnia. But they are also building mosques and spreading a version of Islam that is alien to our Bosnian Islam."¹¹⁵ And a former Interior Minister of Bosnia, Mohammed Besi, declared that Wahhabi religious teachings were "poisoning our youth."¹¹⁶

Eventually, Bosnian authorities began to push back. They started investigating Saudi charities meddling in the region, and in 2002 began conducting a series of raids (the same raids that would uncover the *Tareekh Osama* files). In June of that year, they hit seven Al Haramain offices at once.¹¹⁷ Their final report found that Al Haramain had a "clear lack of any concrete humanitarian objectives."¹¹⁸ Rather, the organization "was a fictitious cover" which "acted as a channel for financing the activities of terrorist organizations."¹¹⁹ Ultimately, the Bosnian government would shutdown Al Haramain's local offices, and in May 2004 the U.S. Treasury Department would follow suit by declaring the Bosnian branch of Al Haramain a terrorist entity and freezing its assets.¹²⁰ Bosnian authorities also raided the regional offices of the Saudi High Commission for Relief. Created in 1993 by Prince Salman Ibn Abdul Aziz al-Saud, the charity would ultimately be funded with over \$600 million, ostensibly to care for war orphans in Bosnia.¹²¹ In the Saudi High Commission's computer files, Bosnian authorities found before-and-after photos of the World Trade Center Towers, the USS Cole and the Nairobi embassy, as well as photos of U.S. military installations, information on pesticides and crop dusters (similar to that found on Zacarias Moussouai's laptop computer), and information on how to forge U.S. State Department identification badges.¹²² In addition, former FBI analyst Matthew Levitt has testified before the U.S. Senate that authorities have been unable to trace about \$41 million known to have been donated to the charity.¹²³

The Wahhabis brought similar pressures to bear on communities in Kosovo. Journalist Gerald Posner reported on how the efforts of Wahhabi missionaries were intertwined with that of the mujahideen:

In the Balkans, while Saudi money backed the Muslim fighters against the Serbs, half of the millions sent to Kosovo were for 388 religious “propagators” whose mission was to convert to Wahhabism those secular Muslims who had strayed.¹²⁴

Soon, the Kosovars were pushing back against the Wahhabis, as well. One official with the Institution for Protection of Kosova Monuments lashed out at the lackadaisical response of the NATO peacekeepers to Wahhabi meddling. He complained, “The Saudis say that NATO and the United Nations will let them do whatever they want, and that we Albanians have nothing to say about it. The Serbs killed us physically, but these fanatics want to kill our cultural heritages.”¹²⁵ Likewise, the Kosovapress News Agency, the media arm of the Kosovo Liberation Army (“KLA”), would ultimately declare:

For more than a century, civilized countries have separated religion from the state. [However], we now see attempts, not only in Kosovo but everywhere Albanians live, to introduce religion into public schools. . . . Supplemental courses for children have been set up by foreign Islamic organizations who hide behind assistance programs. Some radio stations . . . now offer nightly broadcasts in Arabic, which nobody understands and which may lead many to ask, are we in an Arab country? It is time for Albanian mosques to be separated from Arab connections and for Islam to be developed based on Albanian culture and customs.¹²⁶

Terrorism expert Stephen Schwartz encountered the Wahhabis firsthand while spending years doing academic research and relief work in the Balkans.¹²⁷ He recounted just how tense the situation in Kosovo ultimately became:

At the end of March 2000, a group of Saudi “aid workers” was roused by U.N. police from a building in Prishtina, the Kosovo capital, and accused of surveilling foreign vehicles, presumably in preparation for a terrorist attack. A representative of the Saudis, one Al-Hadi, complained that the telephone in the building where they resided had been tapped. The real story behind this was never reported: A KLA commander had discovered the “aid workers” spying on American diplomats and was preparing to kill the Saudis.¹²⁸

The westernized Muslims of the Balkans appear to have been largely successful in resisting Wahhabi influence and indoctrination. As Schwartz noted, “the Kosovars have made it clear they will not suffer the imposition of a foreign and totalitarian form of Islam. This is a victory for moderation and a great asset for the United States in its future approaches to the Muslim world.”¹²⁹

In spite of these efforts, the Wahhabis still appear to maintain a presence in the region. One alarming connection between Saudi Arabia and Bosnia was revealed by the PBS news program *Frontline*, in an episode from April 2004 entitled “Son of Al Qaeda.” The program told the story of Abdurahman Khadr, a young man whose family was deeply involved in Al Qaeda. Indeed, one of their closest neighbors in Afghanistan was the family of Osama bin Laden himself.¹³⁰ However, the young Abdurahman rebelled against his family’s religious extremism. When American troops entered Afghanistan, he decided to help them and volunteered to work

with the CIA. This decision led him on quite a journey, first to Guantanamo Bay where he pretended to be a detainee, and then to Bosnia for another undercover assignment. As *Frontline* explained:

Bosnia is well known in intelligence circles as a major center of al Qaeda activity. Many former fighters from the Afghanistan war and other conflicts have settled here. The Americans believe that Bosnia had become the pipeline for al Qaeda volunteers who wanted to join up with the resistance in Iraq. . . . Abdurahman says the CIA asked him to go down to one of the largest mosques in Sarajevo, the King Fahd mosque, which they believed was a beehive of al Qaeda activity.¹³¹

In other words, the King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo had become a gateway for foreign jihadists looking to fight American soldiers in Iraq. Once again, the Saudis were leading the way.

Chechnya: The conflict in Chechnya began in 1994 as a purely local struggle for political autonomy. But just as the conflict was about to come to a resolution, the violence was re-ignited by a foreign catalyst.¹³² As Stephen Schwartz explained, “the arrival of the Wahhabis, led by a Saudi—Samir Saleh Abdullah Al-Suwailem, who called himself Khattab, and who would be killed in mysterious circumstances in 2002—plunged Chechnya back into a nightmare of kidnappings, murders, suicide terrorism, and similar incidents, which has yet to end.”¹³³ Thus, what once was as a purely political dispute has become a conflagration of terror and violence due to the intervention of the Wahhabis.

The Russians themselves have come to precisely the same conclusion. As reported in *The Washington Post*:

In the Russian government’s view, Chechnya’s war is nothing more or less than a terrorist enterprise, paid for by a combination of al Qaeda money and fraudulent charitable donations, commanded by Arabs trained in Afghanistan and fomented by outsider clerics . . . preaching armed revolution under the theological justification of an Islamic strain known as Wahhabism. . . .

Col. Ilya Shabalkin, a spokesman for Russian forces in Chechnya, said Arabs still make up about one-fifth of Chechnya’s roughly 1,000 active armed militants, who are increasingly confined to the republic’s forests and mountains. “The Arabs are the specialists, they are the experts in mines and communications,” Shabalkin said. He identified their leader as Abu Walid, a Saudi who showed up in Chechnya in the late 1990s.¹³⁴

The Associated Press has also reported on the seminal role that Wahhabis have played in escalating the violence in Chechnya. Indeed, in September 2004, the AP found that three successive Saudi commanders have spearheaded the jihad in Chechnya:

In Chechnya, [local warlord Shamil] Basayev fought alongside Omar Ibn al-Khattab, a Saudi-born rebel leader who died in 2002, apparently after being poisoned, and Basayev later maintained close ties with another Saudi militant, Abu Walid, reportedly killed in Chechnya earlier this year.

Russian officials said yet another Saudi, Mohammed Abu Omar al-Seif, likely had played a role in plotting the school seizure and the other recent terror attacks in Russia. He is considered al-Qaida’s emissary in Chechnya.¹³⁵

The AP further confirmed that, “Along with radical Islamic doctrines, Arab fighters and instructors also have brought new tactics to Chechnya, such as suicide bombings.”¹³⁶ And according to Russian intelligence officials, fighting the Wahhabis “has cost the lives of more than 4,500 Russian soldiers and thousands of rebels, plus many civilians.”¹³⁷ All of which is prologue to one of the most tragic incidents in the global jihad against the West.

On September 3, 2004, a standoff between Russian security forces and 32 Chechen terrorists at Beslan’s Middle School One erupted in gunfire and explosions.¹³⁸ When the smoke cleared 330 hostages lay dead, including 186 schoolchildren.¹³⁹ As details of the atrocity came out, it became clear that there was a foreign element among the terrorists. Russian authorities reported that one of the gunmen had called Saudi Arabia hours before the school was stormed, and that two Arab mercenaries had trained the terrorist cell that executed the assault.¹⁴⁰ Investigators soon came to the conclusion that a Saudi jihadist known as Mohammed Abu Omar al-Seif, then the leader of the foreign volunteers among the Chechen rebels, had planned and financed the operation.¹⁴¹ And *The Guardian* later reported that one of the terrorists who was killed at the school during the deadly climax of the attack had been identified by Russian authorities as a Saudi national named Abu Farukh.¹⁴²

Predictably, Saudi-based charities have also been active in funding mosques and madrassas in Chechnya and other former Soviet republics, and Saudi clerics have given their blessing to Chechen suicide bomb attacks on the Russian army.¹⁴³ Moreover, the mujahideen forces led by Ibn Khattab were financed directly by the Benevolence International Foundation, the IIRO and Al Haramain.¹⁴⁴ In reporting on the financing of the conflict, *The Washington Post* noted:

One source is a Saudi charity, al Haramain, according to Russia’s Federal Security Service. In an internal memo provided by the agency, the FSB accused the charity of wiring \$1 million to Chechen rebels in 1999 and of arranging to buy 500 heavy weapons for them from Taliban units. . . .

Russia forced al Haramain to close its offices in Georgia and neighboring Azerbaijan in 2001, but its workers dispersed to similar groups that continue to work freely in Azerbaijan, Sergei Ignatchenko, the FSB spokesman, said in an interview.¹⁴⁵

And Osama bin Laden himself actively participated in fueling the jihad in Chechnya. *The Washington Post* report continued, “American officials said that several hundred Chechen fighters were trained at al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and that bin Laden sent ‘substantial amounts of money’ to equip Chechen rebels in 1999.”¹⁴⁶

However, perhaps the most disturbing story of Saudi involvement in spurring the violence in Chechnya comes from CIA veteran Robert Baer. Baer recounted his own struggle to understand how the conflict in Chechnya had sustained itself for so long. He wrote:

After I left the CIA I found my answer in a batch of Russian intelligence reports that drew a convincingly direct link between the Saudi government and the Chechen rebels. It was not a question of Saudi charity money finding its way to the Chechens. One report described how on June 22, 1998, forty Chechens were quietly brought to a secret military camp located seventy-five miles southeast of Riyadh. Over the next four months, they were trained in explosives, hand-to-hand combat, and small weapons. A lot of time was set aside for indoctrination into

Wahhabi Islam. [Prince] Salman, the governor of Riyadh and the full brother of King Fahd, was the camp's sponsor.¹⁴⁷

And as elsewhere, the jihadists in Chechnya haven't just been fighting the Russians. Dore Gold has reported that, "In July 1998, a Wahhabi militia in the town of Gudernes clashed with Sufi Muslims from nearby villages after the Chechen Wahhabis tried to destroy a local Sufi shrine."¹⁴⁸

Dagestan, Tajikistan and Other Former Soviet Republics: In 1999, the Chechen conflict spread into Dagestan and other neighboring breakaway republics in Central Asia.¹⁴⁹ Saudi intervention in Chechnya and Dagestan was actively encouraged by the Wahhabi religious authorities. On November 16, 1999, Saudi cleric Abdullah bin Salah al-Obaid, the secretary general of the Muslim World League, declared that Chechnya and Dagestan should be recognized as independent states and lashed out at the Russians for interfering with "Islamic territories."¹⁵⁰ Soon after Al-Obaid's pronouncement, Russian authorities found that the Islamic insurgents in Dagestan were also being financed by the Al Haramain Foundation.¹⁵¹

In a striking example of how the flow of Saudi money impacts local communities, *The Washington Post* told the story of Karamakhi, a small village in Dagestan that was overwhelmed by Wahhabi ideologues seeking to ignite an Islamic insurgency. They reported:

This isolated southwest Russian village of dirt roads and one-story clay brick houses was profoundly peaceful, its residents say, until a Jordanian cleric named Khabib Abdurrahman arrived in the early 1990s with a seemingly irresistible deal.

To a hamlet made destitute by the collapse of the Soviet Union, Abdurrahman brought a slaughtered cow and a free feast every week. In a place where many people were left jobless by the demise of the local collective farm, he handed out \$30 to every convert who came to his simple mosque. And to those adrift in the social chaos of the Soviet breakdown, he offered a new purpose in life – a form of their traditional Islam rooted in fundamentalism and militancy. . . . an Islamic strain known as Wahhabism.¹⁵²

But as repeated time and time again elsewhere, that helping hand soon began twisting arms; and breaking them. *The Post* continued:

"They tried to lure people in a friendly way at first," according to Magomed Makhdiyev, the village imam, who says he tried to withstand the fundamentalists' influence. "But by 1999, they were saying, 'Join us or we'll cut your head off'."
...

By mid-1999, the village had been turned into a fortified base for rebels and religious fundamentalists. . . . The hamlet's 14 policemen had been kicked out, and the Russian constitution declared invalid. Those caught drinking alcohol were beaten with sticks. Religious edicts were announced over a new broadcasting system, residents said.

Two rocket launchers, machine guns and explosives were hauled in and hidden. "There were so many Chechens and Arabs here we couldn't count them," said Makhdiyev, the imam. "They would come in carloads, 10 or 15 cars at a time."

[Saudi ringleader Ibn] Khattab visited the village, solidifying his ties by marrying a local 17-year-old girl. But the settlement remained divided between opponents and supporters of the Wahhabis.¹⁵³

Eventually, government forces drove the Wahhabis out of the village. But the larger financing and logistical networks supporting these operations have proven to be extensive, sophisticated, and exceedingly difficult to root out. In May 2000, neighboring Azerbaijan closed down Al Haramain's office in that country, a Justice Ministry official proclaiming that the organization "posed a threat to Azerbaijan's statehood."¹⁵⁴ During the same period, the IIRO was active in Georgia, funneling money through Pankisi Gorge to the mujahideen forces under Khattab.¹⁵⁵

The Chechen conflict also spread to the west, into the neighboring republics of Karachy-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. Russian authorities arrested eleven Wahhabis there who were plotting to overthrow the local governments and establish an Islamic state.¹⁵⁶ Vladimir Ustinov, Russia's prosecutor-general, announced that raids had uncovered weapons stores and Wahhabi literature. "With direct and indirect support from abroad," he stated, "Wahhabis—the most radical Muslims—are gradually expanding their sphere of influence."¹⁵⁷ Another Russian official warned that hundreds of local Muslim leaders had returned from training in Saudi Arabia, and were actively working to spread Wahhabism throughout the region.¹⁵⁸

Dore Gold has reported that the Saudis have backed insurgents in Uzbekistan, as well. He writes:

In Uzbekistan, for example, Juma Namangani and Tahir Yuldeshev, who became fluent in Arabic and interested in the Wahhabi creed, gained access to Saudi foundations, and in 1990 built a mosque and a *madrassa* in their Uzbek town. They went on to form Islamic revolutionary organizations like Adolat; the Uzbek government charged that both were involved in the attempted assassination of Uzbekistan's president, Islam Karimov, on February 16, 1999. . . . According to Russian officials, the Saudi intelligence agency and Islamic charities aided Yuldeshev.

Such funding would not have been unusual; the Pakistan-based journalist Ahmed Rashid recalls how many of the young members of the new Islamist groups in the early 1990s "were proud to claim that their funds came from Saudi Arabia."¹⁵⁹

Moreover, just days after 9/11, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan would be designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department.¹⁶⁰ In hindsight, it is clear that the Wahhabis saw their victory over the Soviets in Afghanistan as just the beginning. For them, it was never about freeing Afghanistan from the tyranny of communism, it was about spreading their poisonous ideology throughout the Muslim world.

Perhaps the most violent Wahhabi-sponsored insurrection among the former Soviet republics took place in Tajikistan. CIA veteran Robert Baer was stationed there in the early 1990's. He recalled facing consternation and suspicion from his local contacts there, who "seemed to blame everything on Saudi Arabia."¹⁶¹ Eventually, he came to realize they were right. He reported on one key episode:

Along the way, I also recruited [an informant] who was close to the Tajik Islamic chieftain Abdallah Nuri. Nuri operated out of Afghanistan, where he waged a relentless war against the Russians and their local allies. The connection was important: Russia and Tajikistan were begging the U.S. for help against Nuri.

They were convinced the U.S. knew more than it was saying. Nuri received a lot of his funding from our closest ally in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia. Independently, we tracked large clandestine subsidies and weapons shipments from the World Islamic League of Saudi Arabia, an organization protected by the Saudi royal family, going to Nuri.¹⁶²

Fueled by Saudi money, weapons and training, the violence in Tajikistan grew into an all-out civil war. As Dore Gold reported, “In the Tajik civil war that raged from May 1992 until the middle of 1993 between the Tajik government and Islamist armed insurgent groups, many of which were based in Afghanistan, an estimated 50,000 people, mostly civilians, were killed.”¹⁶³

However, perhaps the most perverse example of Saudi meddling occurred after the violence in Tajikistan had stopped. Once the civil war subsided, the Benevolence International Foundation moved into the area, operating a number of orphanages that took in Muslim children whose families were killed in the fighting. In an internal document quoted in federal court filings by the U.S. Justice Department, an operative of the charity urged his superiors to take advantage of this access to war orphans in order to indoctrinate a new generation of jihadists.¹⁶⁴ He referred to his proposal as the “New Tajik Initiative” through which they could rekindle the religious conflict in that country, but time was of the essence. He wrote:

The war and the sufferings are fresh in people’s minds. We have thousands of orphans who would take up the struggle and the cause. . . . In a few years these children of war would have grown old and it would be very difficult to influence them. If the war doesn’t break out again, the wounds of the surrounding society would heal soon. In conclusion, now is the time to work, to move, to act: not next week, not tomorrow and not even today. Now!¹⁶⁵

Like a spreading cancer, the proponents of Wahhabism are relentless.

Egypt: Given the prominent roles of such Al Qaeda luminaries as Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohamed Atta, one would think that the Egyptians would be in no position to point fingers at anyone. Yet on closer inspection, even the notable Egyptian contingent in Al Qaeda’s leadership can be linked back to Saudi Arabia. When members of the radical Muslim Brotherhood were first expelled from Egypt, Saudi Arabia rolled out the red carpet for many of its most prominent and militant members. Both embraced Wahhabi/Salafi Islam, and in particular the ideological teachings of the fourteenth century Islamic scholar Ibn Taimiyyah.¹⁶⁶ As Robert Baer recounted:

When Nasser closed down the Brotherhood in 1954, the militants fled to Saudi Arabia, where they were welcomed with open arms. The Brothers knew their Ibn Taymiyah; they could teach the Qu’ran; and they would work for pennies. For the radical Wahhabis, this was a match made in heaven. Before long, Egyptian Brothers were occupying many of the important chairs in the religious faculties of Saudi Arabia’s universities and *madrasahs*.¹⁶⁷

In time, these Islamic extremists would help found and lead Al Qaeda.

For instance, Muhammad Qutb, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and Ayman al-Zawahiri would each make their way to Saudi Arabia after Anwar Sadat was assassinated on October 6, 1981. Muhammad Qutb was the brother of Sayyid Qutb, the ideological godfather of the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁶⁸ After his brother was executed by Egyptian authorities, Muhammad traveled to Saudi Arabia at King Abdul Aziz University where he taught and inspired Osama bin

Laden as a young man.¹⁶⁹ Rahman, the “blind Sheikh”, taught at a Saudi Arabian college for several years before traveling to Afghanistan where he befriended Bin Laden. He ultimately made his way to the U.S. where he laid the groundwork for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and other terrorist plots.¹⁷⁰ Rahman is now serving a life term in a federal penitentiary. And Al-Zawahiri would travel to Saudi Arabia after being released from an Egyptian prison in 1985. From there he would travel to Afghanistan, eventually becoming the No. 2 man in Al Qaeda.¹⁷¹

While Robert Baer credits the Muslim Brotherhood with helping to radicalize the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, a number of Egyptian observers have strongly objected to that assessment. For instance, in 2003 Wael Abrashi, an editor for the Egyptian news weekly *Ruz al-Yusuf*, wrote of the Saudi influence over Egyptian extremists:

Wahhabism leads, as we have seen, to the birth of extremist, closed, and fanatical streams, that accuse others of heresy, abolish them, and destroy them. The extremist religious groups have moved from the stage of *Takfir* [condemning other Muslims as unbelievers] to the stage of “annihilation and destruction,” in accordance with the strategy of Al-Qa’ida – which Saudi authorities must admit is a local Saudi organization that drew other organizations into it, and not the other way around. All the organizations emerged from under the robe of Wahhabism.

I can say with certainty that after a very careful reading of all the documents and texts of the official investigations linked to all acts of terror that have taken place in Egypt, from the assassination of the late president Anwar Sadat in October 1981, up to the Luxor massacre in 1997, Saudi Arabia was the main station through which most of the Egyptian extremists passed, and emerged bearing with them terrorist thought regarding *Takfir* – thought that they drew from the sheikhs of Wahhabism. They also bore with them funds they received from the Saudi charities.¹⁷²

Perhaps the true nature of the relationship was symbiotic, the Brotherhood inspiring the ready-made radicals of the Saudi religious establishment to more boldly pursue their common agenda, while those Saudis in turn providing a safe haven and financial backing for the Brothers.¹⁷³ Regardless, it is clear that, even in regards to the strong Egyptian presence among Al Qaeda’s leadership, all roads lead through Saudi Arabia.

Germany: In Bonn, Germany, a firestorm of controversy has erupted around the King Fahd Academy, a private school set up with a \$17 million donation by the Saudi royal family.¹⁷⁴ After a teacher at the school was surreptitiously filmed calling for holy war in the name of Allah, an academic audit was conducted by German authorities.¹⁷⁵ They found that the Saudi textbooks used at the school taught the same vicious xenophobia as those back in the Kingdom.¹⁷⁶ One such text declared that, “the Muslim people’s existence has been threatened by Jews and Christians since the crusades, and it is the first duty of every Muslim to prepare to fight against these enemies.”¹⁷⁷

Things became even more heated when German authorities found that a number of people involved with the school were suspected of involvement in terrorist activity. A City spokesman announced, “According to information from intelligence sources people have been observed at the school over the past few months who have contact with terrorists or are themselves suspected of involvement in terrorist attacks. By that I mean teachers and the parents of pupils.”¹⁷⁸ In fact, the German secret service found explosives, bomb-making instructions and

a suicide statement in the home of one man linked to the school.¹⁷⁹ At the same time, another parent involved with the school was already on trial for plotting a series of bombings in Germany.¹⁸⁰ When German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder visited Saudi Arabia in 2003, he finally confronted Crown Prince Abdullah about the school and stated that its extremist teachings “must be stopped.”¹⁸¹ But according to *Newsweek*, the Saudis responded by threatening to harass or even close down the Westernized schools attended by the children of German diplomats and businessmen inside the Kingdom if the King Fahd Academy was interfered with, and the Germans backed off.¹⁸²

The King Fahd Academy is not the only example of Saudi meddling in Germany. Mounir el-Motassadeq was a close associate of the Hamburg contingent of 9/11 hijackers. A student from Morocco, he was ultimately convicted by a German court of aiding and abetting the attacks on September 11.¹⁸³ In Motassadeq’s Hamburg apartment, German investigators found the business card of Muhammad J. Fakihi, chief of the Saudi embassy’s Islamic Affairs Department.¹⁸⁴ They also discovered that Motassadeq had made numerous phone calls to Saudi Arabia, calls which were ultimately traced to known Islamic jihadists.¹⁸⁵ However, Saudi officials refused to cooperate with German authorities inquiring about Fakihi, and matters quickly went downhill from there.¹⁸⁶

Fakihi was soon found to have met with the ringleader of yet another suspected Al Qaeda cell at the Al Nur Mosque in Berlin.¹⁸⁷ As *The Wall Street Journal* has reported, German investigators discovered that the Al Nur Mosque, which had already received at least \$1.2 million from the Al Haramain Foundation, had become a haven for Islamic extremists.¹⁸⁸ In March 2003, German authorities finally reached the breaking point:

Last month German police raided a suspected terrorist cell in Berlin, arresting a half-dozen men and seizing bomb-making equipment, flight-simulator software and chemicals. After the arrests, sources say, the Germans confronted the Saudis and declared Fakihi persona non grata. “We don’t do that unless the evidence is very grave,” says a German official.¹⁸⁹

U.S. officials later confided to *Newsweek* that Fakihi was found to have transferred Saudi embassy funds, suspected to be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, at the direction of Al Qaeda operatives with direct ties to Osama bin Laden.¹⁹⁰ One official stated that Fakihi was “more than just a sympathizer of bin Laden. He was organizationally involved.”¹⁹¹

Great Britain: On July 7, 2005, three bombs went off in London’s subway, and another exploded on a double-decker bus.¹⁹² 56 people were killed, and another 700 were injured.¹⁹³ The terrorist cell responsible for the attack was composed of British nationals of Pakistani descent, all of whom died in the explosions. A second wave of attempted bombings occurred on July 21, 2005.¹⁹⁴ Although the placement of the bombs and the recipe for the homemade explosives were similar to the first attack, this time the bombs were duds.¹⁹⁵ The cell members were immigrants of East African origin, all of whom survived and were promptly captured.¹⁹⁶ Although the investigation into the attacks is ongoing, British authorities have already found that one thing which both cells had in common were links to Saudi Arabia. For example, Muktar Said Ibrahim, the ringleader of the July 21 cell, was actually born and raised in Saudi Arabia.¹⁹⁷ Not only did he return to Saudi Arabia for a month in 2003, but he told friends he had gone there to receive “training.”¹⁹⁸ Likewise, Hasib Hussain, one of the July 7 bombers, had stopped in Riyadh on his way to Pakistan in July 2004.¹⁹⁹ According to British government reports on the bombings, Hussain first became interested in radical Islam after a trip to Saudi Arabia in 2002.²⁰⁰

British authorities are also investigating a series of suspicious phone calls and e-mails between Saudi Arabia and Britain in the months preceding the attacks.²⁰¹ In particular, Isaac Hamdi (aka “Osman Hussain”), another member of the July 21 cell, called Saudi Arabia just before his capture.²⁰² Even more disturbing, it appears that the Saudi government actually uncovered preparations for the attack in December 2003.²⁰³ As reported in *The Observer*, they informed British authorities at the time that they had arrested a Saudi national who was raising funds for a terrorist attack on Great Britain. The plot would employ four suicide bombers, at least some of whom would be British citizens, detonating bombs in crowded areas of London – precisely what took place on July 7, 2005.²⁰⁴

Yet another factor linking the two terrorist cells together is the Finsbury Park Mosque in north London. British authorities suspect that all eight of the bombers are connected to the mosque.²⁰⁵ In particular, Mohammed Sidique Khan, the ringleader of the deadly July 7 bombings, was known to frequent there.²⁰⁶ And the London subway bombers are not the only terrorists connected to the mosque. Convicted Al Qaeda operative Zacarias Moussaoui, who has often been referred to (mistakenly) as the missing 20th hijacker, also attended the Finsbury Park Mosque, as did attempted shoe-bomber Richard Reid.²⁰⁷ The mosque has even held training sessions in the use of AK-47 assault rifles, according to local news reports.²⁰⁸

The Finsbury Park Mosque was built with a grant by the Saudi royal family, and has consistently maintained close ties with the Kingdom.²⁰⁹ For instance, Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad is one of the Mosque’s most prominent former imams.²¹⁰ A native of Syria, Bakri moved to Saudi Arabia in 1979 in order to complete his religious studies at the Islamic School of al-Saltiyah in Mecca.²¹¹ In 1983, he settled in Jeddah where he formed Al Muhajiroun, a jihadist group dedicated to establishing a worldwide Islamic state.²¹² The group has been tied to terrorist activities around the world, including the efforts of a group of Islamic extremists to undertake flight training in Phoenix, Arizona prior to September 11.²¹³ Indeed, Bakri once referred to Al Muhajiroun as “the mouth, eyes and ears” of Osama bin Laden.²¹⁴

In 1986, Bakri finally left Saudi Arabia for London where he continued to pursue his extremist agenda.²¹⁵ On the first anniversary of the September 11 attacks, Bakri held a celebratory conference at the Finsbury Park Mosque during which he launched the “Islamic Council of Britain,” an organization dedicated to the overthrow of the democratic British government and the imposition of Islamic law in its place.²¹⁶ In interviews intended to promote his new organization, Bakri publicly admitted that his current efforts to incite jihad in the West were being funded by a group of wealthy Saudi businessmen.²¹⁷ The following year he attempted to throw another celebration in honor of the “Magnificent 19” hijackers of 9/11.²¹⁸ In warning that terrorist attacks on London in the near future were “inevitable,” Bakri explained, “We don’t make a distinction between civilians and non-civilians, innocents and non-innocents. Only between Muslims and unbelievers. And the life of an unbeliever has no value. It has no sanctity.”²¹⁹ Bakri has also implored his followers to, “Prepare as much as you can from strength and from force to terrorize – because terrorism, it is part of Islam.”²²⁰ In August 2005, after London was attacked just as he had predicted, Bakri was finally barred from reentering the country by British authorities.²²¹ But the Finsbury Park Mosque continues to be a magnet for extremist activity in Great Britain.

And the beat goes on. Just weeks ago, on June 29, authorities in London discovered a would-be car bomb smoldering outside a nightclub in Piccadilly Circus. They soon discovered a second prospective car bomb, and the next day three of the Islamic radicals involved in the plot

ignited yet a third car loaded with propane canisters and gasoline and crashed it into the entrance of Glasgow Airport.²²² The outraged Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, addressed the public that same day. While emphasizing the need for tolerance toward the broader Muslim community, he was quick to point a finger at the true source of Britain's problems with Islamic extremism:

London Mayor Ken Livingstone called on Britons Saturday not to demonize Muslims after a double car bomb plot was foiled in the capital, amid fears of an Islamist terror threat.

At the same time he criticized Britain over its ties with Saudi Arabia, which he said had fuelled intolerance in the past through its Wahhabist form of Islam, creating a "major problem." . . .

"We have got to understand that when we talk about the Wahhabi strand of Islam, which is very intolerant, our major problem in dealing with it is that it flows out of Saudi Arabia," he said.

He said Wahhabi was the official religion of the Saudi royal family, and noted that Riyadh was one of the main buyers of British arms.

"For a very long time, politicians at national level were refusing to be sufficiently critical of the fact that the Saudi regime didn't clean up its act," he said.

"Now we are assured that they have, but there's been decades of literally hundreds of millions of pounds flowing out of Saudi Arabia with official backing into the most intolerant strand of Islam, buying influence all over the world for it."²²³

Sure enough, it was only a matter of time before the other shoe dropped. British authorities soon announced the arrest of seven doctors involved in the plot, three of whom were born and raised in Saudi Arabia, including the alleged ringleader, Mohamed Asha.²²⁴ And the two men who were arrested at the scene of the Glasgow Airport attack have also been identified as adherents of Wahhabi Islam. Kafeel Ahmed, an Indian national who was badly burnt in the Glasgow attack, had previously lived in Saudi Arabia and once, "tried to persuade their local mosque in Bangalore to adopt a more hard line, Saudi-inspired version of Islam."²²⁵ Likewise, the family of Bilal Abdulla, the Iraqi doctor arrested at the scene, has now been identified as "Wahhabi Islamists".²²⁶

India: As note above, the IIRO has been actively involved in supporting the jihad against India for the independence of the northern province of Kashmir, and IIRO employees have directly participated in terrorist plots targeting U.S. consulates in India. Other Saudi-based charities have also pitched in. For instance, one Pakistani newspaper reported that, "WAMY is also involved in religious and *Jihadi* training for its member organizations," including groups responsible for terrorist attacks in Kashmir, such as Lashkar e Toiba and Jamiat Taleba Arabia.²²⁷ Indeed, the Indian government has stated that 90% of the funding for these groups comes from WAMY and similar foreign-based Islamic charities.²²⁸ This shouldn't come as a surprise given that both Saudi schoolbooks and Osama bin Laden himself have implored the people of Saudi Arabia to be generous with their support of the jihad in Kashmir.

On July 11, 2006, these efforts finely bore fruit. Seven bombs ripped through passenger cars on Mumbai's local rail system, killing 209 people and injuring over 700 others.²²⁹ Indian investigators soon found that the operation had been funded from Saudi Arabia. As *The Times of*

India reported, “More than [900,000 riyals] were transferred from Saudi Arabia to Mumbai in the past one year for the 7/11 blasts, said anti-Terrorists squad sources on Tuesday. A part of the money was used over a period of six months to plan and execute the blasts on Mumbai's suburban trains, which highly placed sources said was the job of Lashkar-e-Taiba.”²³⁰ The money had been sent through the same *hawala* money transferring system that Al Qaeda operatives have used elsewhere to evade official detection.

Indonesia: In Indonesia, Saudi Arabia has been leveraging its economic superiority in an effort to replace the more tolerant brand of Islam native to the region with Wahhabism. *The New York Times* reported on this effort in 2003, finding that, “From the financing of educational institutions to giving money for militant Islamic groups, the influence of Saudi Arabia, and Saudi charities, has been growing steadily here in the world’s most populous Muslim country.”²³¹ In particular, Saudi money is being used to fund thousands of Islamic boarding schools throughout Indonesia called *pesantren*.²³² A number of Indonesian officials have attributed the spread of Islamic extremism in the country to these boarding schools, as well as to the textbooks and religious literature supplied by Saudi-based charities operating in the region.²³³ *The New York Times* continued:

The libraries of many *pesantren* – including the prestigious Gontor *pesantren* in East Java – are filled with books from Saudi Arabia. (Gontor’s newest building, the Saudi building, is also a gift from Saudi Arabia.) Few *pesantren* libraries hold any recent books by Western authors.

The Saudi religious affairs office in Jakarta churns out translations from Arabic to Indonesian – about one million books a year, an official there said. The titles include “Questions and Answers about Islamic Principles,” by [former Grand Mufti] Bin Baaz, one of Saudi Arabia’s most venerated interpreters of Islam.²³⁴

Once again, the Kingdom is working diligently to export its education system abroad. And in addition to the schools, the IIRO alone has boasted of building 575 mosques in Indonesia, complete with Wahhabi literature and Korans.²³⁵

However, these outreach and education efforts have continually been intertwined with the recruiting and funding of local jihadist organizations. As *The New York Times* reported:

The Saudi money has come in two forms, Indonesian and Western officials said: above-board funds for religious and educational purposes, and quietly disbursed funds for militant Islamic groups. The Saudi money has had a profound effect on extremist groups, allowing some to keep going and inspiring others to start recruiting, the officials said.

A Saudi charity, Al Haramain, provides a good example of this dual role. Three years ago it signed a formal memorandum of understanding with the Indonesian Ministry of Religion that allowed it to finance educational institutions.

But Al Haramain also appears to have served as a conduit for money to Jemaah Islamiyah, a Southeast Asian terrorist organization that aims to build Islamic states in the region.²³⁶

Indeed, Al Qaeda’s former point man in the region, a Kuwaiti named Omar al-Faruq, has admitted to U.S. authorities that, “Al Haramain was the funding mechanism of all operations in Indonesia. Money was laundered through the foundation by donors from the Middle East.”²³⁷

The Christian Science Monitor has also picked up on the story, reporting on the direct connection between the pesantren and the extremists:

The use of a small network of Indonesian boarding schools as a recruiting avenue for the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist group has sent alarm bells ringing in the West.

Some officials worry that Saudi Arabian money is being used to spread the intolerant Wahhabi Islam adhered to by members of Al Qaeda and the affiliated JI through the country's schools and mosques, producing a steady creep of radical ideas in a country famed for its religious tolerance.²³⁸

The Bali nightclub bombing presents an instructive example of how the various parts of the Wahhabi program can come together.

On October 12, 2002, two remotely detonated bombs went off at Paddy's Bar and the Sari Club in Kuta, Indonesia.²³⁹ The bombs killed 202 people including 88 Australians, 26 Britons and seven Americans.²⁴⁰ The investigation quickly led authorities to operatives of Jemaah Islamiyah, a local jihadist group which had already been linked to Al Qaeda, with whom it had established joint training camps.²⁴¹ The chief Al Qaeda operative assigned to work with the group, Omar al-Faruq, had been operating in Indonesia and the Philippines since 1994, but was captured in Indonesia in June 2002 and turned over to U.S. forces in Afghanistan.²⁴² Under interrogation by American and Indonesian investigators, Al-Faruq confessed that a Saudi cleric known by the pseudonym Abu Abdullah al-Emarati had provided money to Jemaah Islamiyah which was then used to finance the attack.²⁴³ Specifically, the Saudi cleric transferred \$74,000 to a bank account controlled by Abu Bakar Bashir, the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, who then used the money to buy several tons of explosives from a corrupt Indonesian military official.²⁴⁴ As Rohan Gunaratna has noted, investigators now believe that a portion of those explosives were used in the Bali bombs.²⁴⁵ Moreover, it turned out that several members of the Jemaah Islamiyah cell which perpetrated the Bali nightclub bombings worked together at a *pesantren* in East Java prior to the attack.²⁴⁶ Likewise, Abu Bakar Bashir himself heads yet another *pesantren* in Central Java.²⁴⁷

What's more, the violence is spreading. Jemaah Islamiya has now been caught planning to expand its terrorist operations abroad. In Afghanistan, U.S. authorities found a 20-minute videotape by the group which showed a number of prospective bombing targets in Singapore.²⁴⁸ Yet another violent jihadist groups in Indonesia is Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah ("LJ"), whose avowed goal is to establish an Islamic state in the Moluccas.²⁴⁹ The group has been at the forefront of the Christian-Muslim fighting in that region, which took some 10,000 lives between 1999 and 2002.²⁵⁰ As authority for their actions, LJ claims to have received a fatwa from Saudi cleric Sheikh Rabea bin Hadi al-Madkhali.²⁵¹ The leader of the group has boasted of meeting with Osama bin Laden personally, and of offering to send volunteers to fight for him in Afghanistan.²⁵²

Iraq: Wahhabi tentacles reached into northern Iraq well before the U.S. invasion in 2003. According to a press release by the Saudi embassy in March 2001, the IIRO alone had poured over \$19 million into the region over the previous decade. By 2002, Western reporters were noting that new white mosques had been springing up in the predominantly Kurdish portion of northern Iraq with the letters "IIRO" stamped on them.²⁵³ During this period, both WAMY and Al Haramain were also active in the region.²⁵⁴ Nabil Musawi of the Iraqi National Congress

described to *Frontline* how the Saudis advanced their extremist Wahhabi agenda in northern Iraq (as they have elsewhere around the world):

I can tell you from my own personal experience in northern Iraq during the '90s, what they do is, they would go to tiny, very poor villages. They would establish a center. The center would serve as a mosque, as school, as a community center. They would – sign a budget – a sheik, a mullah. . . . These are the Wahhabis, yes. And before you know it, they are totally dominating the life in the village. These villages are extremely poor. It's fertile ground for recruitment of young men who have nowhere to go, who have no future, no education. So they become totally dedicated to the cause of the Wahhabis. Even if they started their life as something else, as probably moderate Sunnis or moderate Shia'a, they end up being extreme Wahhabis because they were the only ones who offered them hope. That's – that's how it works.²⁵⁵

Indeed, Saudi meddling prompted one senior Kurdish cleric to complain that, “The Wahhabis are stealing our youth.”²⁵⁶

Saudi funds were also flowing to the principal terrorist organizations in northern Iraq, including Ansar al-Islam, the group of Kurdish jihadists which at one time had hosted Al Qaeda's former leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.²⁵⁷ According to Dore Gold, U.S. intelligence officials have discovered that Ansar al-Islam was started with between \$300,000 and \$600,000 of seed money that originated from Saudi Arabia.²⁵⁸ When the U.S. invaded Iraq, this organization quickly geared itself to attacking coalition forces. As Stephen Schwartz reported just a few months after the invasion:

[I]n Iraqi Kurdistan, where Saudi-Wahhabi religious organizations were introduced before the war, the Wahhabi militia Ansar al-Islam is again active. Attacked and scattered by U.S. forces during the main offensive in April, it has reconstituted itself and has struck in the towns of Halabja, Biahrah, and Dohuk, according to a Kurdish leader. The car bomb is Ansar's weapon of choice. The group is known to have Saudi participants, and propaganda in its favor appears in the Saudi media.²⁵⁹

One of Ansar al-Islam's very first suicide bombings occurred on March 26, 2003. The attack killed five people, including Australian journalist Paul Moran. Later it was discovered that the suicide bomber was a foreign volunteer named Abdul Aziz Saud al-Gharbi. He was from the city of Hail, Saudi Arabia.²⁶⁰

After the U.S. invasion, the sphere of Wahhabi influence began pushing south. In June 2003, one U.S. intelligence official confided that, “Now, all of sudden, these Wahhabi guys have been appearing. We're hearing that word a lot more: Wahhabi.”²⁶¹ That same month, Stephen Schwartz reported that, “Wahhabi imams in the Fallujah mosques, as well as dozens of agitators from Saudi Arabia, have begun aggressive preaching of suicide bombings against coalition forces as part of a campaign of guerrilla warfare.”²⁶² And by December 2003, an Iraqi representative visiting Washington, DC warned that, “The Fallujah region is filling up with Wahhabis.”²⁶³ As U.S. forces responded by cranking up the pressure on Fallujah, the Saudis worked to undermine their efforts. During the summer of 2004, Saudi relief agencies shipped food and medical supplies directly to the insurgent hotbed in order to aid “the residents of Fallujah who stood fast against the fierce war machine of the occupation forces.”²⁶⁴

Indeed, the most notorious leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was himself a devotee of Wahhabi (or Salafi) Islam.²⁶⁵ After returning home to Jordan from Afghanistan in 1992, Al-Zarqawi came under the tutelage of a Saudi-trained Wahhabi cleric while incarcerated in a Jordanian prison.²⁶⁶ That encounter would set the stage for his future career as a jihadist. Initially, Zarqawi's terrorist organization in Iraq was known as "Tawhid and Jihad".²⁶⁷ Noting the central role of *tawhid* (monotheism) in Wahhabi doctrine, Stephen Schwartz observed:

Zarqawi's Wahhabism did not originate in the country of his birth; it is a Saudi invention. Saudi Arabia prides itself on being known as "the land of *tawhid*." The rhetoric of [Tawhid and Jihad] betrays the Saudi origin of the terror its acolytes sow far and wide. And in the mosques of Saudi Arabia, state-employed Wahhabi clerics continue to deliver Friday sermons inciting the faithful to "monotheism and jihad"—meaning, first and foremost, passage across Saudi Arabia's long northern border into Iraq to kill and die.²⁶⁸

As detailed in Part 1, Saudi volunteers have taken a leading role in the foreign insurgency in Iraq. Al-Zarqawi himself once stated that the young men of Saudi Arabia had become a growing source of his own foot soldiers.²⁶⁹ And Israeli terrorism expert Reuven Paz found that 70% of the suicide bombings in Iraq over one six-month period had been carried out by Saudi nationals.²⁷⁰ Indeed, Iraq's own national security adviser has now publicly acknowledged that, "Most of those who blow themselves up in Iraq are Saudi nationals."²⁷¹ This appears to include the suicide bomber who attacked a mess tent in Mosul on December 22, 2004, killing 18 Americans.²⁷² Others reports have indicated that Saudi volunteers have helped sustain the insurgency by bringing substantial sums of cash with them as they infiltrate Iraq.²⁷³

Yet another hallmark of Wahhabi meddling in Iraq is the extreme violence being directed at Iraqi Shiites. Once again, Stephen Schwartz explains the connection:

The Arabic term for polytheism is *shirk*, or "assigning partners to Allah." According to the Wahhabi creed, in recent centuries, only the followers of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and their descendants have been true monotheists. All non-Wahhabis—whether nominally Muslim, Jewish, Christian, Hindu, or Buddhist—are steeped in *shirk* and deserve to be killed so that pure Wahhabi monotheism can reign supreme.

In this twisted view, the majority of Iraqis are guilty of *shirk*. Up to 70 percent of Iraqis belong to the Shia sect of Islam, and as such follow the guidance of their imams and ayatollahs, wise theologians recognized for their study and insight. According to the Wahhabis, to follow a supreme cleric or *marja* like Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, leader of the Iraqi Shias, is to place him on an equal level with God. Shias should therefore be killed as polytheists, their property confiscated, and their women dishonored.²⁷⁴

Al-Zarqawi seems to have been a driving force in the effort to kill Iraqi Shiites. Although many media reports have interpreted his attacks on Shiites as a means of sparking a civil war, which might embarrass the U.S. and thwart a Shiite-dominated government, a closer look makes it clear that these attacks are also an end in themselves.

In a letter seeking help from Al Qaeda's leadership, Al-Zarqawi referred to the Shiites as "the most evil of mankind . . . the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying

enemy, and the penetrating venom.”²⁷⁵ His proposed solution was “to strike the religious, military, and other cadres among the Shiites with blow after blow until they bend to the Sunnis.”²⁷⁶ In fact, by one account Al-Zarqawi’s predilection for slaughtering Shiites was initially a sticking point between him and Osama bin Laden, who is believed to have collaborated with certain radical Shiite groups in the past.²⁷⁷ In the end, Bin Laden appears to have been won over by Al-Zarqawi’s mounting successes.

Israel: As mentioned in Part 2, the Saudis raised \$155 million in one telethon alone to support the Intifada in Israel.²⁷⁸ Indeed, according to *U.S. News & World Report*, “the CIA learned Saudi donations were funding as much as half of Hamas’s budget and paying off the families of suicide bombers.”²⁷⁹ Saudi authorities eventually admitted that they had made cash payments to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers who had murdered Israeli men, women and children. Saudi spokesman Adel al-Jubeir did a lot of tap dancing on that issue, but ultimately conceded, “If a family loses a breadwinner and they’re living in poverty, yes, we give them money. Are some of those families, families who had a suicide bomber? Yes.”²⁸⁰

But to fully understand just how aggressive and radical the Saudis have been, consider the fact that even Yasser Arafat’s PLO has chafed at their influence. In a December 2000 letter from one of Arafat’s deputies, none other than Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), to Saudi Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz, the PLO complained:

The Saudi committee responsible for transferring donations to beneficiaries has been sending large amounts to radical committees and associations, among which the Islamic Society which belongs to Hamas, the al-Islah association, and to brethren who engage in jihad in all regions. This fact badly influences the internal situation; it also results in the strengthening of these brethren, and has therefore a negative impact on all sides.²⁸¹

Even the Palestinians have rejected Saudi meddling as being too confrontational and violent. Unfortunately, as in so many other cases, these protests were apparently too little and too late, and we are seeing the results of that fact in the streets of Gaza today.²⁸²

Morocco: Moroccan authorities are now struggling to counter the influence of the Wahhabi movement in that country, which has been spearheaded by the militant group Salafiya Jihadia and its spiritual leader Mohamed Fizazi.²⁸³ The *Asia Times* recounted how the movement first gained a foothold in Morocco:

The Wahhabi doctrine preached by Fizazi, at odds with Morocco’s more open Malekite rite, has been tolerated, even encouraged by the state for about two decades, analysts say. The imported Saudi doctrine was key in preventing the spread of two other forms of Islamism [which threatened the current political regime] . . . Furthermore, Morocco suffered the drawback of important financial aid from Saudi Arabia, and had no political choice other than to “import” the Wahhabi doctrine, which was radical yet non violent at that time.

This tacit encouragement nonetheless became a serious threat to the local regime when, following the schism in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War in 1991, a violent branch, the Salafia Jihadia, emerged in Morocco and called for jihad against the West and allied governments in order to expel foreign forces from Arab land.

Radical Wahhabi theorists started to spread their call for jihad in clandestine mosques, which escaped the control of local authorities . . . It then became

increasingly difficult for the state to control these international imported radical doctrines.²⁸⁴

Once again, the Saudis were able to expand their sphere of influence through political opportunism and economic leverage.

British terrorism expert Alison Pargeter has concurred with that assessment. She also noted that Saudi schooling played an important role in establishing a Wahhabi foothold in Morocco:

In an effort to counter balance the growing power of the Islamists the late King Hassan II opened the door to Saudi Arabia that was keen to promote Wahhabism inside Morocco. The Saudis began to channel significant funds into Morocco and developed institutions to spread their own propaganda, including setting up Qu'ranic schools and charitable organizations. They also brought Moroccans to train in Saudi Arabia, thus creating a new generation of radical preachers who had been schooled in a rigid interpretation of Islam. These included [several local clerics including] Mohamed Fizazi who were officially sanctioned as imams in Morocco.²⁸⁵

Sure enough, Wahhabi terrorism was soon to follow. On May 16, 2003, five suicide bombers simultaneously struck in Casablanca, killing 33 people. Mohamed Fizazi is now serving a 30-year sentence in a Moroccan prison for his role in the attacks.²⁸⁶

Fizazi has also been connected to the Madrid train bombings. He preached at a mosque attended by Jamel Zougam, Mohamed Chaoui and Abelaziz Benyaich, all members of the terrorist cell which carried out the attacks.²⁸⁷ In fact, authorities now believe that Fizazi had a face-to-face meeting with Zougam in August 2001 in which they discussed clandestine financing logistics.²⁸⁸ Zougam, who was identified by Madrid survivors as one of the men who placed bombs aboard the trains on the day of the attack, admitted as much in a wiretapped phone conversation he had with an accomplice.²⁸⁹

Fizazi has also been connected to yet another Al Qaeda terrorist attack – September 11. He traveled to the same Hamburg mosque frequented by Mohamed Atta and the other members of the Hamburg contingent of 9/11 hijackers in the years prior to the attack, where he was videotaped imploring his listeners to “fight the Americans,” and declaring that, “The Jews and Crusaders must have their throats slit!”²⁹⁰

The Philippines. Ever since Osama bin Laden sent Mohammed Jamal Khalifa to Southeast Asia in 1988 to begin coordinating with local jihadist groups there, the reach of the Wahhabis has been constantly expanding across the region. One of Khalifa's first projects was financing and cultivating the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines. Indeed, one congressional leader in the Philippines went so far as to tell *The Wall Street Journal*, “The Abu Sayyaf wouldn't exist without Khalifa. They are his creation.”²⁹¹ And in the last public interview before his death last year the founder of Abu Sayyaf, Khaddafy Janjalani, confessed that his organization was kick-started with millions in Philippine pesos delivered to him by Khalifa.²⁹²

Likewise, in August 2000, one of the Philippines' leading newspapers interviewed another former member of Abu Sayyaf, known by the alias Abu Anzar, about the role Saudi-based charities had played in funding terrorism in that country. They reported:

In an interview with the *Inquirer*, Anzar said the IIRO was used by Bin Laden and Khalifa to distribute funds for the purchase of arms and other logistical requirements of the Abu Sayyaf in the guise of relief and livelihood projects for Muslim communities in Mindanao.

“Only 10 to 30 percent of the foreign funding goes to the legitimate relief and livelihood projects and the rest go to terrorist operations,” Anzar added. . . .

Anzar said this allowed the Abu Sayyaf to sustain their operations. The more they engaged in terrorism, the more financial support poured in from Bin Laden and Khalifa.²⁹³

The report went on to note that Philippine intelligence had already confirmed much of Abu Anzar’s account.²⁹⁴ Another Saudi-based charity, the Al Haramain Foundation, has also drawn official attention. As *U.S. News & World Report* recounted, “At Manila’s international airport, authorities stopped Agus Dwikarna, an al Haramain representative based in Indonesia. In his suitcase were C4 explosives.”²⁹⁵

The end result of these efforts is clear. In the years since Khalifa first arrived in the Philippines, Abu Sayyaf would go on to slaughter 54 people in the Christian village of Ipil in 1995.²⁹⁶ In 2001, they kidnapped and beheaded an American tourist named Guillermo Sobero. In 2002, they detonated five bombs in Zamboanga City, killing 22 people including a U.S. serviceman.²⁹⁷ And in 2004, *The Boston Globe* reported that, “a terrorist bombing on the scale of the Madrid attacks was averted in Manila with the arrest last week of four members of Abu Sayyaf, an Al Qaeda splinter group, and the seizure of 36 kilos of TNT.”²⁹⁸

Along with Khalifa, other Saudis have also taken part in the effort to spread Islamic violence in the region. In January 2005, a Saudi national named Mohammad Abdullah Sughayer was arrested upon his arrival in Zamboanga City and subsequently expelled from the country. Military authorities discovered that he had made contact with key members of Abu Sayyaf, and a captured gunman from the group identified Sughayer as one of their financiers.²⁹⁹ Al Qaeda also helped the Moro Islamic Liberation Front establish a training camp in the Philippines known as Camp Abumakar.³⁰⁰ One of the military trainers sent to the camp was a Saudi national known as Al-Maki Ragab. He would eventually die in a suicide attack on a Philippine military installation in October 1997, apparently in an effort to set an inspiring example for his Filipino trainees.³⁰¹

Spain: On March 11, 2004, a series of ten backpack bombs detonated inside the trains of the Madrid mass transit system.³⁰² The bombs killed 191 people, and wounded another 1,900.³⁰³ One of the suspected architects of the attack, an Egyptian jihadist named Rabei Osman Ahmed, was subsequently tracked down and arrested in Italy.³⁰⁴ In a series of wiretapped phone conversations, Ahmed was overheard boasting to one prospective recruit that, “The Madrid attack was my project. And those who died as martyrs, those were my very dear friends.”³⁰⁵ Authorities have also connected Ahmed to the Tunisian ringleader of the cell that carried out the attacks, Serhane Ben Abdelmajid Fakhed, who blew himself up along with seven other cell members when they were cornered by police in a Madrid apartment.³⁰⁶ In the wiretapped conversations, Ahmed also revealed his financial benefactor while operating in Spain in the years leading up to the attack – Sheikh Salman al-Awdah, a former university professor from Saudi Arabia.³⁰⁷ Ahmed was overheard telling a prospective terrorist recruit, “I worked for him in Spain. I did really well in that period.”³⁰⁸ At the time, Al-Awdah was already known to have been a personal friend of Osama bin Laden.³⁰⁹ In fact, in one of his videotaped statements Bin Laden praised Al-Awdah for his work “enlightening” Muslim youths.³¹⁰ As noted above, yet

another key player in the Madrid bombings, Jamel Zougram, has been linked to Saudi-backed Wahhabis in his native Morocco.

Saudi connections to the Madrid train bombings aren't the only troubling reports to come out of Spain recently. Spanish authorities have also exposed a prominent Syrian expatriate named Mohammed Ghaleb Zouaydi, who arrived in Spain from Jeddah in 1998. He had lived in Jeddah for several years and established a sophisticated business practice there.³¹¹ At one point he reportedly worked directly for the Saudi royal family.³¹² Once in Spain, he quickly expanded the operations of his investment and trading company in that country, a move he had already started laying the groundwork for while he was still residing in the Kingdom.³¹³ It wasn't long after September 11 that Zouaydi began attracting official attention. As *The New York Times* reported:

Spanish and American investigators believe that hundreds of thousands of dollars flowed from Saudi Arabia into the accounts of Spanish companies that were used as conduits for money to Al Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups, law enforcement and intelligence officials said . . . [including] a Saudi trading and investment company that sent nearly \$700,000 to Spain between 1996 and 2001. The company was run by Mohamed Zouaydi, who was charged earlier this year in Spain with raising money for a Qaeda cell there that operated throughout Europe and the Middle East.³¹⁴

Indeed, U.S. and Spanish investigators found that Zouaydi's business front had been using some of the exact same techniques that other notorious Saudi-based charities and business fronts had used in order to finance Islamic extremists while avoiding official attention. *The Times* continued:

Spanish officials said Mr. Zouaydi's companies had two purposes: to launder money sent to the Spanish cell from abroad, and to generate new funds. These were used to send recruits to fight as mujahedeen in places like Chechnya and Bosnia and to support Islamic radicals around the world.

Accordingly, Spanish court documents indicate, Mr. Zouaydi and Mr. Galyoun kept two sets of books. One was used for official purposes like their tax returns. Another kept track of unofficial expenditures, including donations made to radicals and terrorists.

"There was a double accounting system," one Spanish investigator said, "and there was money that came from abroad and was mixed between the real business projects and the donations for jihad."³¹⁵

In particular, the investigation found a \$225,000 transfer from Zouaydi to the Belgium representative of the Global Relief Foundation, one of the charity fronts used by Al Qaeda whose assets have been frozen by the U.S. Treasury Department.³¹⁶ Although Zouaydi was ultimately convicted in Spain of being a member of a terrorist organization, financial fraud and document falsification, he was only sentenced to nine years in prison.³¹⁷

Sudan: After a decade of relative peace, civil war was re-ignited in Sudan in 1983 when the Islamic fundamentalist government in Khartoum tried to impose sharia law over the entire country, just as it existed in Saudi Arabia.³¹⁸ Since then, nearly two-and-a-half million people have been killed in the fighting, first in the South between the Islamist regime in Khartoum (led by the National Islamic Front) and southern Christians and Animists, and more recently in

Darfur as the same jihadist regime has begun targeting non-Wahhabi Muslims to the east.³¹⁹ And throughout it all, Saudi Arabia has been the principal supporter of the Islamist regime in its neighbor across the Red Sea. The relationship dates back decades, and has often taken the form of direct military aid.

According to a report on Sudan by The Library of Congress, Saudi Arabia became Sudan's primary source of investment capital in the 1970's.³²⁰ In particular, the Saudis worked directly with the emerging National Islamic Front (the "NIF"). The report recounted:

The Faisal Islamic Bank, whose principal patron was the Saudi prince, Muhammad ibn Faisal Al Saud, was officially established in Sudan in 1977 by the Faisal Islamic Bank Act. The "open door" policy enabled Saudi Arabia, which had a huge surplus after the 1973 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) increases in the price of petroleum, to invest in Sudan. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the National Islamic Front, played a prominent role on the board of directors of the Faisal Islamic Bank, thus strengthening the bank's position in Sudan.³²¹

Through the 1980's, "Saudi Arabia provided Sudan with military aid, concessionary loans, outright financial grants, and oil at prices well below the cost of petroleum in the international market."³²² Included in the military aid were an assortment of cargo planes and helicopters, seventy American-made tanks, and thousands of light military vehicles.³²³

Saudi military support continued through the 1990's, as well. For example, Human Rights Watch came across crates of anti-personnel mines being shipped into Sudan in 1998. Their report on Sudan went into detail on what they found:

During a July 1997 visit to SPLA-held areas in southern Sudan, Human Rights Watch found numerous Belgian PRB M3 plastic antitank mines in crates that were marked: "Ministry of Defence and Aviation, Dammam - Saudi Arabia, Exp. 5202, Package No. 12030." In 1996, the government of Saudi Arabia declared, in response to a U.N. resolution seeking the views of member states on illicit arms transfers, that "there is no illicit transfer of arms through Saudi Arabia." Taking this statement at face value, and given the Ministry of Defense marking on the crates, the implication is that this particular shipment was an official one, authorized by the government. In 1995 a U.S. company owned by an unnamed Saudi was said to have shipped to Sudan \$120 million in arms, including howitzers, mortars and tank ammunition, according to published reports.³²⁴

Connecting Saudi financial and military support with the horrific bloodshed across Sudan, one observer stated bluntly:

In Sudan, the Saudis bankrolled the National Islamic Front (NIF), founded by the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus far, the NIF has starved or slaughtered as many as two million Christians, Muslims, and animists. In the case of the Nuba, an indigenous south Sudanese community, the NIF attempted an authentic genocide.³²⁵

The close ties between the government of Saudi Arabia and the extremist regime in Khartoum have continued in the post-9/11 era. In November 2002, just prior to the start of the current jihad in Darfur, the governments of Saudi Arabia and Sudan signed a comprehensive "cooperation agreement" to facilitate their special economic and cultural relationship.³²⁶ However, the

influence Saudi Arabia holds over Sudan goes far beyond mere economic aid and geo-political maneuvering.

Anthropologist Victoria Bernal observed first-hand how Saudi Arabia's superior economy and domineering ideology have radicalized the Sudanese on a local level, as well. Focusing on the perceptions and attitudes she found in a single Sudanese village, she wrote:

From the mid-1970s through the 1980s, [the village of] Wad al-Abbas's incorporation into the global economy was mediated primarily by Saudi Arabia. The Saudi kingdom exerted influence on Sudan at the national level by pressuring then-President Numeiri to institute *shari'a* law in 1983 and funding opposition groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time, Saudi Arabia attracted ordinary Sudanese from all walks of life as labor migrants. Villagers from Wad al-Abbas found work in Saudi Arabia as truck drivers, electricians, factory workers and sales clerks. The national economic and identity crises of Sudan and the labor migration of villagers to Saudi Arabia were catalysts for change, stimulating the rise of "fundamentalist" Islam in the village.³²⁷

And this influence continues to this day. For example, in January 2002, WAMY announced the opening of 28 new Wahhabi mosques in Sudan.³²⁸ But the people of Sudan have also been the target of an even more alarming "outreach" program originating from the Kingdom.

Osama bin Laden moved his operations to Sudan in 1991, and remained there until he was forced out in 1996 in the aftermath of a botched assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.³²⁹ While in Sudan, Al Qaeda worked closely with the NIF and its military arm—the jihadist militia known as the Popular Defense Force ("PDF"). According to documents filed in federal court by the U.S. Justice Department:

Al Qaeda agreed to train the PDF in guerilla warfare tactics for the "civil" war in Southern Sudan against Christians and animists. In addition, *al Qaeda* . . . obtained weapons for the PDF and the Sudanese with *al Qaeda* funds—in one instance, obtaining thousands of [Russian-made] Kalashnikov weapons for use by the PDF. Abu Hajer [a prominent Al Qaeda operative] also advised an *al Qaeda* member then in the Sudan that *al Qaeda* was seeking to develop chemical weapons in an area near Khartoum. In part, the weapons were to be used by the PDF in the civil war.³³⁰

Al Qaeda even augmented Sudan's intelligence services. As Khartoum welcomed jihadist trainees from around Africa and the Middle East, Al Qaeda would screen new arrivals for possible spies.³³¹

Moreover, there have been recent indications that Al Qaeda still maintains an important presence in Sudan. In the wake of the U.S. military incursion into Afghanistan in 2001, Al Qaeda and the Taliban were reported to have smuggled their gold reserves to Sudan.³³² Indeed, it appears that Al Qaeda's financial apparatus in Sudan remained intact long after Osama bin Laden left. Adel Batterjee, the wealthy Saudi businessman with a well-known career in terrorist financing, established an office for his Saudi-based charity front in Sudan shortly after Bin Laden arrived.³³³ As *The Chicago Tribune* reported:

Batterjee's charity aids bin Laden supporters who are training Sudanese soldiers to battle Christian rebels, according to court filings by Enaam Arnaout, Batterjee's right-hand man. The U.S. claims the charity followed bin Laden to

Sudan specifically to aid Al Qaeda. Batterjee was chairman of Al Shamal Islamic Bank in the capital of Khartoum as recently as 2002. The U.S. alleges that years before Batterjee became chairman, bin Laden invested \$50 million in the bank – a claim the bank has denied.³³⁴

Not surprisingly, now that its training camps in Afghanistan have been destroyed, Al Qaeda operatives have begun to reestablish them elsewhere. In May 2003, seventeen Saudis were caught running a terrorist training camp in northern Sudan.³³⁵ And in January 2004, *The Telegraph* reported:

American special forces teams have been sent to Sudan to hunt down Saudi Arabian terrorists who have re-established secret al-Qa'eda training camps in remote mountain ranges in the north-eastern quarter of the country. . . . An American Delta Force officer, who recently spent a week in Sudan tracking the terrorists, said the camps are used to train new recruits to wage jihad, or holy war, against the West and its allies. The trainees are instructed how to handle weapons and build and transport bombs.

The officer said it was proving difficult to pin the terrorists down. “We have a read on the rat-lines and the wider camp areas, but these are shifting camps in a very spread out part of the country. Our job is to tie them down tighter and tighter. They are moving pretty easily from their base points to the Red Sea coast, and then back and forth to Saudi.”³³⁶

Reviewing Wahhabism’s impact on Sudan, through the meddling of both the Saudi government and Al Qaeda itself, ultimately leads to the current crisis in Darfur.

Wahhabi xenophobia and jihadism have directly contributed to the horrific violence in Darfur. While many have interpreted the bloodshed as being driven primarily by racial and ethnic animosities rather than religion, Nina Shea of the Center for Religious Freedom has explained the sectarian nature of the conflict. She writes:

In both the south and in Darfur, the policies of the regime — which is an Arab Islamist military dictatorship — against ethnic African villagers have had racial and ethnic overtones and involved struggles over resources. But more significantly, the regime has been motivated in both cases by a radical Islamist agenda. [Gen. Omar Hassan al-]Bashir attempted to Islamicize and Arabize the south through the forcible imposition of sharia (Islamic law). He launched, by his own definition, a “jihad” against the south when it resisted.

Though the tribes of Darfur are Muslim, they are not of the hardline Salafist movement favored by Khartoum’s National Islamic Front government, an offshoot of the radical Muslim Brotherhood (now based in Saudi Arabia after being crushed in Egypt, its birthplace). The Darfur Muslims do not speak Arabic, their women wear colorful African garb, and they do not follow the strict criminal code of Khartoum’s Wahhabi-style sharia, which calls for the flogging of those who drink alcohol, the body-part-amputation of thieves, the stoning of adulterers, and the execution of blasphemers.

For years Khartoum has treated the black, Sufi Muslims of Darfur as second-class citizens, systematically discriminating against them in providing development opportunities, government services, and positions of power. When they rebelled

against this policy of extreme marginalization, they became — in the view of a regime that conflates religion with politics — “apostate.” Under Islamist rules, apostates are to be put to death or taken as slaves. In 1992, six pro-government Sudanese imams issued a fatwa making this explicit: “An insurgent who was previously a Muslim is now an apostate and a non-Muslim is a non-believer standing as a bulwark against the spread of Islam, and Islam has granted the freedom of killing both of them.” Though the fatwa was intended at that time for the Muslims of the central Nuba province and the Christians and animists of the south, it equally applies today to the Muslims of Darfur.³³⁷

In other words, Wahhabism is the ideology driving the massacre of Sufi Muslims in Darfur, just as it once drove the massacre of Shiites and Sufis in Afghanistan and Algeria, and just as it is doing so in Iraq today.

Osama bin Laden himself seems to have confirmed as much in an April 2006 audiotape in which he lashed out at a plan to insert U.N. peacekeepers into the region to stop the violence. He declared, “I call on mujahedeen and their supporters, especially in Sudan and the Arab peninsula, to prepare for a long war against the crusader plunderers in western Sudan.”³³⁸ Moreover, by the time Bin Laden made this threat, the number of people killed in Darfur was already estimated at 180,000, almost all of them Muslims.³³⁹ And nowhere in his statement did Bin Laden suggest an alternative way to mitigate that violence. Why would Bin Laden intervene so aggressively in an entirely Muslim-on-Muslim conflict? The answer is simple – the men, women and children of Darfur are the wrong kind of Muslims.

Tanzania and Somalia: Reviewing recent press reports from Tanzania is much like reading a how-to-manual on engineering a radical Islamic insurgency – first establish a foothold and then push steadily outward. And once again, Saudi-based Wahhabis are the engineers of this endeavor. As noted in the previous report, the assets of the Al Haramain office in Tanzania have now been frozen, due in large part to direct connections between its staffers and the perpetrators of the U.S. Embassy bombing in Dar es Salam.³⁴⁰ But Saudi ideologues are taking an active role in spreading Wahhabism among the general populace, as well. According to Western intelligence reports cited in *Time* magazine, the Saudis are spending \$1 million dollar a year to build mosques and influence the government in Tanzania.³⁴¹ They have already taken control of 30 mosques in the capital, and are steadily working to increase that number.³⁴² Newly indoctrinated Wahhabi extremists have now begun beating women who are not fully covered in public, and bombing public places that serve alcohol.³⁴³ “We get money from Yemen and Saudi Arabia,” confided one such extremist. “Officially the money is used to buy medicine, but in reality the money is given to us to support our work and buy guns.”³⁴⁴

One of the most recent chapters in the Wahhabis’ global campaign is still unfolding in Somalia today, where a group of militias backed by “Islamic courts” briefly took control of Mogadishu. Predictably, Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Fraser was soon testifying before the U.S. Congress that these insurgent groups were being financed by wealthy Saudis. In June 2006, she explained, “I don’t want to say the Saudi government is supporting any particular (Islamic) court, but I do know that there is money coming in from Saudi Arabia.”³⁴⁵ As always, strident intolerance and unspeakable violence were soon to follow the flow of Saudi money. Just a month later, in July 2006, the Associated Press reported that Islamic militants in Somalia had opened fire on a room full of unarmed civilians, mostly teenagers. Two people were killed,

including a young girl. Their crime: watching a World Cup soccer game on TV, which the militants had pronounced a violation of Islamic law.³⁴⁶

The United States: Unbelievably, the Saudis have also been using the same insidious tactics to spread Wahhabism inside the United States. However, in the wake of September 11, American officials appear to have been more proactive in expelling Saudi demagogues than other nations. In January 2004, the U.S. State Department yanked the Saudi-sponsored diplomatic visas of sixteen employees of the Institute for Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America due to their extremist activities.³⁴⁷ The Institute operates in Fairfax, Virginia as a satellite campus of the Al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University in Riyadh, and was formerly sponsored by the Saudi embassy.³⁴⁸ Indeed, former Saudi ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan formerly served as the chairman of its Board of Trustees.³⁴⁹ The Institute was raided by federal agents in July 2004, but apparently is still operating today.³⁵⁰ In the months leading up to the expulsion of the sixteen Institute employees, over 50 other people with Saudi diplomatic credentials were quietly forced out of the U.S.³⁵¹ A senior U.S. law enforcement official told *The Washington Post* that the exodus was due to “an ongoing effort to protect the homeland.”³⁵²

In addition, one of the Saudi-sponsored clerics in the U.S. has been arrested by federal authorities because of his ties to terrorist financing.³⁵³ Somali-born Omar Abdi Mohamed spent a significant amount of time in Saudi Arabia during the 1980’s, before traveling to the U.S. with Saudi backing.³⁵⁴ Investigators found a number of suspicious circumstances surrounding Mohamed’s presence in the U.S., including the fact that he had never actually worked at the mosque that sponsored his visa, and the fact that he hid his Saudi government sponsorship from U.S. immigration authorities during a routine interview.³⁵⁵ He also received at least \$326,000 from the Global Relief Foundation, a charity designated by the Treasury Department as a supporter of global terrorism.³⁵⁶ Much of that money disappeared after Mohamed gave it to an operator of the paper-less money transferring system known as *hawala*.³⁵⁷ Authorities suspect at least some of that money made its way into the hands of radical Islamic terrorist groups in Somalia.³⁵⁸

In spite of the best efforts of federal authorities, the Wahhabi agenda continues to be advanced in this country. The Center for Religious Freedom clearly documented as much in their seminal report on Wahhabi literature being distributed in the U.S. The 2005 report states:

The Center for Religious Freedom has gathered samples of over 200 such texts over the last twelve months – all from American mosques and all spread, sponsored or otherwise generated by Saudi Arabia. They demonstrate the ongoing indoctrination of Muslims in the United States in the hostility and belligerence of Saudi Arabia’s hardline *Wahhabi* sect of Islam. . . . The Wahhabism that the Saudi monarchy enforces, and on which it bases its legitimacy, is shown in these documents as a fanatically bigoted, xenophobic and sometimes violent ideology. These publications articulate its wrathful dogma, rejecting the coexistence of different religions and explicitly condemning Christians, Jews, all other non-Muslims, as well as non-Wahhabi Muslims.³⁵⁹

And Saudi efforts to advance Wahhabism in the U.S. go well beyond passing out literature. As *The New York Times* has reported:

By building mosques across the country, sending Americans to the Middle East to be trained as imams and promoting pilgrimages to Mecca, the Saudis have spent

hundreds of millions of dollars in an effort to stamp their austere version of Islam on the lives of Muslims in the United States. . . .

That version is called Wahhabism, although the Saudis are loath to use the term in referring to their proselytizing in this country. As practiced in Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism denies equal rights to women, and its teachings have inspired the violent extremism of Osama bin Laden and the Taliban government that harbors him in Afghanistan.

“In America, the Saudis don't call it Wahhabism because they don't want to have all the albatrosses associated with the sect,” said Earle H. Waugh, a professor of religion at the University of Alberta, who is the author of several books about Muslims in North America. “But they have a strong mission tradition, and they have used their money to export their ideology to America. Wahhabism says that Islam is the superior religion and must always be so.”

Mr. Alahmari, the Saudi charity official based in Ann Arbor, estimates that half the mosques and Islamic schools in the United States have been built with the help of money from Saudi Arabia. The Saudi royal family has directly contributed to the construction of a dozen mosques, including the \$8.1 million King Fahd Mosque in Culver City, Calif.

Although the Saudi Embassy official maintained that “there are absolutely no strings attached” to Saudi spending, several scholars and American Muslims said the money had often involved a quid pro quo.

“At several mosques around Los Angeles, they would dole out money month by month until something happened that they didn't like, such as boys and girls mixing together in religious classes,” said Mr. Akbarut, a member of the Islamic Center of Southern California. He said the Pasadena mosque where he prays had refused money from the Saudis.³⁶⁰

Indeed, the King Fahd Mosque in Culver City, California is one of the largest mosques in America.³⁶¹ The former chief imam of that mosque, Fahad al-Thumari, was expelled from the U.S. in May 2003 for his anti-American jihadist rhetoric.³⁶² An accredited Saudi diplomat with “a network of contacts in other cities in the United States,” Al-Thumari is suspected of aiding two of the 9/11 hijackers when they first arrived in the U.S. In particular, he was caught lying to federal investigators about his relationship with Omar al-Bayoumi (discussed in Part 1), yet another Saudi who is known to have helped the two hijackers get settled in San Diego.³⁶³

The above review is not intended to be exhaustive, and a more definitive examination would address the Wahhabi presence in such far flung locales as Cambodia, Comoros, Ethiopia, Poland and the Netherlands.³⁶⁴ However, the above examples of how Saudi interlopers, and the financial apparatus that supports them, have pushed the sphere of influence of the rabid ideology of Wahhabism ever outward should be sufficient to make a few points clear. The first is that this is a complex and multi-tiered effort to infiltrate vulnerable communities, establish a foothold, and propagate their ideology through violence and intimidation from there. Looking over the examples above, the same basic program has played itself out in country after country.

Terrorism expert Stephen Schwartz provided a vivid and compelling description of the Wahhabis' *modus operandi* in an article written for *The Weekly Standard* just months after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. He began with the global scope of the agenda:

The Wahhabi power-grab strategy in pursuit of the extremists' mad dream of imposing their "pure" Islam on all Muslims, then launching a jihad against the world, begins with indoctrination. Food, clothing, tents, and other relief supplies are distributed only to those willing to take classes in Wahhabi doctrine. Preachers are sent from the Gulf states with the mission of Wahhabizing local Muslims by opposing "practices of unbelief" alleged to be rife in local Islam. These may include friendship with Jews and Christians; acceptance of women's driving or going to school; traditional customs such as visiting graves (hated by Wahhabis, who believe gravestones are idols and honoring the dead is polytheistic); and devotion to Sufism, the Islamic form of spirituality.

The next step is the establishment of training centers and camps where unemployed youths are trained to fight and lead irregular combat operations, especially suicide attacks. These centers are often directly linked to relief distribution points. Incitement of "martyrdom" against better-equipped, modern forces is a key Wahhabi tactic. Its purpose is to provoke major retaliation. Civilian casualties are useful in inciting orphaned and alienated young people to join the "struggle." A further inducement is the classic offer of stipends for recruits' families if they die in suicide operations. For the displaced victims of war, this may be the only economic reward immediately available.

Then, crucially, Wahhabi agitators seek to eliminate opposition from local religious leaders. New mosques and madrassas are built with Saudi subsidies and staffed exclusively by Wahhabi imams and teachers. The system of madrassas is expanded, where possible to become an independent extremist educational system on the Pakistani model, setting neighbor against neighbor and son against father. Where necessary, established imams are paid cash to "convert" to Wahhabism. Uncooperative imams are boycotted and loudly labeled unbelievers or government spies. Imams who actively oppose the extremists risk their lives—witness the murder of traditional imams in Chechnya, Daghestan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and other countries. At least 200 such murders can be readily documented. This fact by itself explains why anti-Wahhabi imams around the world—even in America—are so reluctant to go public.

Finally, Wahhabi agents often engage in vandalism against local graveyards, historic mosques, and the tombs of Muslim saints. This should be expected in Iraq, where the aim will be to provoke conflict between Sunnis and Shias, which the Wahhabis will present to the world as Shia aggression against the Sunni minority. This will increase support for the Wahhabis among Sunnis but open the door to Iranian military intervention to defend the Shias—the worst possible outcome. Such was the strategy the Wahhabis used against the Shia Hazara minority in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. It produced massive bloodshed and nearly drew Iran into war with the Afghan regime.³⁶⁵

Observing how this program has played itself out around the world, clearly the Saudis have embraced the maxim, “Think globally, Act locally!” What’s also remarkable is how prophetic Schwartz’s description of the sectarian violence in Iraq has been, from the pre-war meddling in northern Iraq described by Nabil Musawi, to the attacks on the historic Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf and the Golden Mosque in Samara, to the assassination of six Sunni tribal leaders who had been actively opposing Al Qaeda just this Summer.³⁶⁶ Indeed, the insurgents who attacked the Golden Mosque in February 2006, a gambit which has succeeded in igniting a full-blown civil war, have now been identified as a gang of four Iraqis and four Saudis.³⁶⁷ And of course, the Bush administration is playing directly into the Wahhabis’ hands by blaming Iranian backed Shiites for the carnage in the streets of Baghdad, despite all evidence to the contrary.

Finally, it’s impossible to ignore that much (if not most) of the violence being generated by this ideological movement is actually against other Muslims, including Shiites, Sufis, and even other Sunnis whose religious traditions differ from those of the Wahhabis. As terrorism expert Steven Emerson observed in congressional testimony:

Using an elaborate network of mosques, schools, “charitable” and “humanitarian” organization, and even official diplomatic facilities, Saudi Arabia has for years fostered the growth and spread of a militant doctrinal interpretation of Islam. The ideology of Wahhabism has been exported not only throughout the Middle East, but throughout the world resulting in the indoctrination of anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic and anti-western hatred among new generations of militant Islamic youth. Moderate and secular Muslims are also targeted. Indeed, in looking at the numbers of terrorist victims worldwide at the hands of Islamic extremists during the past decade, the largest number of victims have been fellow Muslims killed or wounded by militant Islamic groups.³⁶⁸

While Wahhabi ideologues are directly responsible for the murder of thousands of Americans, they are just as responsible for the murder of tens of thousands of their fellow Muslims in Afghanistan, Algeria, Sudan, and now Iraq. As Emerson concluded, “Coupled with [Saudi Arabia’s] virtually unlimited financial resources, the Wahhabi *dawah* invariably leads to acts of terror against non-Muslims and moderate Muslims alike.”³⁶⁹

This fact also tragically illustrates the degree to which the Bush administration has bungled our strategic response to the attacks on September 11. In light of the Wahhabi carnage visited on their fellow Muslims, we should have easily been able to rally the world’s Shiites, Sufis and moderate Sunnis in confronting our mutual enemy. Instead, we have alienated the Muslim world by attacking a country which had nothing to do with 9/11. And incomprehensibly, the Bush administration has chosen to treat the Saudis with kid gloves, a subject which will be explored in depth later. Perhaps it is not too late to convince the greater Islamic community that we are really on the same side of this global conflict, but we’ve certainly made that job much more difficult. Regardless, we are clearly on a collision course with the Wahhabi ideology, and the nation which drives it – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Index

Chapter 6

¹ Douglas Jehl, “Holy War Lured Saudis as Rulers Looked Away,” *The New York Times*, December 27, 2001 (Available at <http://www.pulitzer.org/year/2002/explanatory-reporting/works/122701.html>); “Terrorism: Questions & Answers – Saudi Arabia,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2004; Dore Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003), p. 129; “Saudi Arabia: The double-act wears thin,” *The Economist*, September 27, 2001 (Available at http://www.economist.com/printedition/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=797542).

² “House of Saud,” PBS *Frontline*, original airdate February 8, 2005 (Available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saud/etc/script.html>); Barbara Slavin, “Saudi al-Qaeda claims Jeddah strike,” *USA Today*, December 6, 2004 (Available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-12-06-saudi-blast_x.htm).

³ Testimony of David Aufhauser before the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, June 15, 2004 (Available at <http://hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Testimony&HearingID=181&WitnessID=655>); Gerald Posner, *Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Saudi-U.S. Connection* (New York: Random House, 2005), p. 167.

⁴ Note that yet another terrorist financing expert put the total at \$87 billion from 1973 through 2002. Rachel Ehrenfeld, “The Saudi Connection,” *National Review*, January 1, 2004 (Available at <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/ehrenfeld200406010834.asp>); “Two Years After 9/11: Keeping America Safe,” United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, March 2004, p. 8 (Available at http://kyl.senate.gov/legis_center/subdocs/2yrsafter.pdf).

⁵ David E. Kaplan, “The Saudi Connection,” *U.S. News and World Report*, December 15, 2003 (Available at <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/031215/15terror.htm>).

⁶ “Two Years After 9/11: Keeping America Safe,” United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, p. 4.

⁷ “Terrorist Financing,” Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, October 2002, p. 7 (Available at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Terrorist_Financing_TF.pdf).

⁸ Testimony of Jean-Charles Brisard before the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, October 22, 2003, p. 6 (Available at <http://banking.senate.gov/files/brisard.pdf>).

⁹ Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom*, p. 111.

¹⁰ “Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to the Commission,” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, p. 106 (Available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf); David B. Ottaway, “U.S. Eyes Money Trails of Saudi-Backed Charities,” *The Washington Post*, August 19, 2004 (Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A13266-2004Aug18.html>).

¹¹ “Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph,” 9/11 Commission, p. 106.

¹² “The West, Christians and Jews in Saudi Arabian Schoolbooks,” Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace, January 2003 (Available at <http://www.edume.org/reports/10/toc.htm>).

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Testimony of Brisard before the United States Senate, October 22, 2003, p. 5.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁶ Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom*, p. 180.

¹⁷ Sam Roe, Laurie Cohen and Stephen Franklin, “How Saudi wealth fueled holy war,” *Chicago Tribune*, February 22, 2004 (Available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/specials/chi-0402220496feb22_1_7589348.story?coll=chi-newsspecials-hed). See also Ottaway, “U.S. Eyes Money Trails of Saudi-Backed Charities” (“[T]he kingdom established 200 Islamic colleges, 210 Islamic centers, 1,500 mosques and

2,000 schools for Muslim children in non-Islamic countries, according to King Fahd's personal Web site. In 1984, the king built a \$130 million printing plant in Medina devoted to producing Saudi-approved translations of the Koran. By 2000, the kingdom had distributed 138 million copies worldwide.”)

¹⁸ Lisa Beyer with Scott MacLeod, “Inside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” *Time*, September 14, 2003 (Available at <http://time-proxy.yaga.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,1005663,00.html?internalid=AC>).

¹⁹ “Saudi Time Bomb?” PBS *Frontline*, original airdate November 15, 2001 (Available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/etc/script.html>). See also “Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing,” Independent Task Force of Terrorist Financing Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, June 15, 2004, pp. 21-22 (“More than a million young Pakistanis are educated in these *madrassas* . . . Islamic religious schools in Afghanistan, India, Yemen, Africa, Central Asia, the Balkans (particularly Bosnia and Kosovo), North America, Chechnya, and Dagestan are also significantly financed by Saudi sources.”) (Available at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Revised_Terrorist_Financing.pdf).

²⁰ Ibid.; Posner, *Secrets of the Kingdom*, p. 140.

²¹ “Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with Larry King, CNN,” United States Department of Defense transcript, December 18, 2002 (Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t12192002_t12181kl.html).

²² The Kingdom’s counterpart to the American Red Cross, the Saudi Arabian Red Crescent Society had an annual budget of over \$66 million in 2002. Like the IIRO, the Saudi Red Crescent participated directly in financing the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan from the very beginning of that campaign. Prominent Saudi jihadist and Al Qaeda financier Wael Hamza Julaidan served as one of the heads of the Saudi Red Crescent Society in Pakistan, where he used the organization to finance the mujahideen volunteers who were preparing to enter Afghanistan. He worked directly with Sheikh Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden in that effort. In fact, a letter from Azzam refers to the Saudi Red Crescent as being “at the forefront” of the effort to fund the jihad.

Testimony of Steven Emerson with Jonathan Levin before the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, July 31, 2003 (Available at http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/073103emerson.pdf); Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom*, pp. 129, 150; Testimony of Brisard before the United States Senate, October 22, 2003, p. 18.

²³ Founded in 1963, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (“WAMY”) is the world’s largest Muslim youth organization. Headquartered in Riyadh, WAMY has 66 offices around the world, including such far-flung locales as Auckland and Cordoba. WAMY’s U.S. office was incorporated in 1992 by Abdullah bin Laden, one of Osama’s brothers. Yet another member of the family, Omar bin Laden, would later become a director of WAMY. WAMY’s outreach programs have consistently reflected its Wahhabi orientation. For instance, one monthly magazine published by WAMY, *The Future of Islam*, featured a cover story about Saudi cleric Sheikh Ayed al-Qarni. In the featured interview, Al-Qarni confided that he prays for the destruction of America several times a day. He also encouraged his Saudi followers to go join the jihad against U.S. personnel in Iraq.

Testimony of Emerson and Levin before the United States Senate, July 31, 2003; Susan Schmidt, “Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S.,” *The Washington Post*, October 2, 2003 (Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A31402-2003Oct1?language=printer>). Craig Unger, *House of Bush, House of Saud* (New York: Scribner 2004), p. 94; Stephen Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam* (Anchor Books: New York 2003), pp. 312-13.

²⁴ Testimony of Brisard before the United States Senate, October 22, 2003, p. 17.

²⁵ Kaplan, “The Saudi Connection.”

²⁶ The fuller passage reads:

The Islamic institutions, especially those in Saudi Arabia, are well financed. Saudi officials say that the Government has donated \$100 million to the Islamic institutions for Bosnia relief efforts and that private donations, which according to a new law must be funneled through the Government, have added \$50 million.

Despite formal denials from the relief organizations, Saudi officials say an increasing amount of the charity on behalf of the Bosnians is now used to provide arms and logistical support for Arab volunteers.

“Since August most of the money raised for relief has been turned over to the Bosnians for weapons,” a Saudi official said. “And most contributors probably support this.” Firepower Is Improved

Reports from the Balkans suggest that the Arab assistance has significantly improved the firepower of the Muslim-dominated Bosnian Government forces, providing assault rifles, mortars, rockets and other weapons to troops who had been equipped largely with hunting rifles and shotguns at the beginning of the war.

Chris Hedges, “Muslims From Afar Joining ‘Holy War’ in Bosnia,” *The New York Times*, December 5, 1992 (Available at <http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10614FB3E550C768CDDAB0994DA494D81>).

²⁷ Robert Baer, *Sleeping With the Devil* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2003), p. 140.

²⁸ Testimony of Emerson and Levin before the United States Senate, July 31, 2003.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Testimony of Mathew Epstein and Evan Kohlmann before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, March 11, 2003, p. 2 (Available at <http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/031103me.pdf>).

³¹ Baer, *Sleeping with the Devil*, p. 141.

³² Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom*, p. 215; Glen Simpson, “List of Early al Qaeda Donors Points to Saudi Elite, Charities,” *The Wall Street Journal*, March 18, 2003 (Available at <http://www67.homepage.villanova.edu/andrew.gaspero/article%204.htm>); Testimony of Brisard before the United States Senate, October 22, 2003, p. 18.

³³ Ibid., p. 17.

³⁴ Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom*, p. 144.

³⁵ Ibid.; Testimony of Epstein and Kohlmann before the United States House of Representatives, March 11, 2003, p. 6.

³⁶ Ibid.; Matthew Epstein, “Trails Lead to Saudis,” *National Review*, May 21, 2003 (Available at <http://www.nationalreview.com/script/printpage.p?ref=/comment/comment-epstein052103.asp>).

³⁷ Glenn Simpson, “U.S. Officials Knew of Ties Between Terror, Charities,” *The Wall Street Journal*, May 9, 2003 (Available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10524385762417300.html>).

³⁸ Testimony of Brisard before the United States Senate, October 22, 2003, p. 18.

³⁹ Kaplan, “The Saudi Connection”; Testimony of Epstein and Kohlmann before the United States House of Representatives, March 11, 2003, p. 6.

⁴⁰ Ibid.; Declaration in Support of Pre-Trial Detention, *United States v. Soliman S. Biheiri*, No. 03-365-A (E.D.Va. August 14, 2003), p. 3 (Available at <http://files.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/usbiheiri81403knaff.pdf>).

⁴¹ Ibid.; Testimony of Epstein and Kohlmann before the United States House of Representatives, March 11, 2003, p. 6.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 7; Celia W. Dugger, “India Accuses 4 of Plotting to Bomb U.S. Consulates,” *The New York Times*, January 21, 1999 (Available with subscription at <http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F50A1FFA3B540C728EDDA80894D1494D81>).

⁴⁵ Testimony of Emerson and Levin before the United States Senate, July 31, 2003.

⁴⁶ Baer, *Sleeping with the Devil*, p. 69; Mary Ann Weaver, “Blowback,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 1996 (Available at <http://billstclair.com/911/timeline/1990s/atlanticmonthly0596.html>). Citing the same 1996 U.S. intelligence report mentioned above, *The Wall Street Journal* reported:

“The former head of the IIRO office in the Philippines, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, has been linked to Manila-based plots to target the pope and U.S. airlines; his brother-in-law is Usama bin Ladin,” the report states, using alternate spellings of Mr. bin Laden’s names. In addition, “another high-ranking [IIRO] official in the Philippines leads Hamas meetings, and the majority of Hamas members in the Philippines are employed by the organization.”

Simpson, “U.S. Officials Knew of Ties Between Terror, Charities.”

⁴⁷ Affidavit in Support of Complaint, *United States v. Benevolence International Foundation, Inc.*, No. 02 CR 0414 (N.D. Ill. filed April 29, 2002), pp. 14, 16-21 (Available at <http://files.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/usbif42902cmp.pdf>); “Associate of Bin Laden’s brother-in-law arrested,” *USA Today* (Associated Press), October 23, 2003 (Available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-10-23-alqaeda-arrest_x.htm); Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Berkley Books, 2002), pp. 192-94, 233-35, 242-43.

⁴⁸ Testimony of Epstein and Kohlmann before the United States House of Representatives, March 11, 2003, p. 4; Testimony of Emerson and Levin before the United States Senate, July 31, 2003.

⁴⁹ Testimony of Epstein and Kohlmann before the United States House of Representatives, March 11, 2003, p. 6; Jeff Gerth and Judith Miller, “Saudis Called Slow to Help Stem Terror Finances,” *The New York Times*, December 1, 2002 (Available at <http://www.mafhoum.com/press4/saudi123.htm>).

⁵⁰ Testimony of Epstein and Kohlmann before the United States House of Representatives, March 11, 2003, p. 5.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9; Testimony of Emerson and Levin before the United States Senate, July 31, 2003; First Amended Complaint, *In re Terrorist Attack on September 11, 2001*, No. 03 MD 1570 (S.D.N.Y. March 10, 2004), p. 126 (Available at http://www.sept11terrorlitigation.com/pdf/Federal_Insurance_Company_First_Amended_Complaint.pdf).

⁵² Testimony of Epstein and Kohlmann before the United States House of Representatives, March 11, 2003, p. 9.

⁵³ Al-Ali was also involved with Sana-Bell Al-Kheer, a \$267 million investment fund which was intended to make the IIRO self-sufficient. Sana-Bell’s U.S. office was co-founded by two members of the Golden Chain of Al Qaeda financiers, Saleh Abdullah Kamel and Ibrahim Muhammad Afandi. *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 9-10; First Amended Complaint, *In re Terrorist Attack on September 11, 2001*, pp. 126-28.

⁵⁴ Testimony of Emerson and Levin before the United States Senate, July 31, 2003; Testimony of Epstein and Kohlmann before the United States House of Representatives, March 11, 2003, p. 15.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

⁵⁸ Epstein, “Trails Lead to Saudis.”

⁵⁹ Annual Report of The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, May 2005, p. 116 (Available at <http://www.uscifr.gov/countries/publications/currentreport/2005annualRpt.pdf#page=1>). *See also* “Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing,” Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, pp. 20-22 (“As a core tenet of its foreign policy, Saudi Arabia funds the global propagation of Wahabism, a brand of Islam that, in some instances, supports militancy by encouraging divisiveness and violent acts against Muslims and non-Muslims alike. We are concerned that this massive spending is helping to create the next generation of terrorists and therefore constitutes a paramount strategic threat to the United States. . . . Such Saudi financing is contributing significantly to the radicalization of millions of Muslims in places ranging from Pakistan to Indonesia to Nigeria to the United States.”).

⁶⁰ Beyer and MacLeod, “Inside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”

⁶¹ Ottaway, “U.S. Eyes Money Trails of Saudi-Backed Charities.”

⁶² “Policy Focus: Saudi Arabia,” United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, February 2004 (Available at <http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/publications/policyfocus/archive/saudipolicybrief.pdf>).

⁶³ William Dalrymple, “Who is the real enemy?,” *The Observer* (London), July 20, 2003 (Available at <http://books.guardian.co.uk/reviews/politicsphilosophyandsociety/0,6121,1001499,00.html>).

⁶⁴ Greg Levine, “Saudi Prince Backs Murdoch, Ups News Corp. Stake,” *Forbes*, September 6, 2005 (Available at http://www.forbes.com/2005/09/06/alwaleed-murdoch-billionaires-cx_gl_0906autofacescan02.html).

In fact, Prince Whalid has boasted of using his influence to alter Fox News coverage of the France riots in October and November of 2005. In a conference call with several reporters, he recounted:

I was in America watching Fox News when I saw a news report being labeled as Muslim riots. I immediately called up [Rupert] Murdoch and informed him that it was wrong to label any riot caused by whatever reason as Muslim. After a short while, there was a change, and the news report about Muslim riots was simply labeled as riots.

Asma Ali Zain, “Media should not be allowed to rule in Iraq: Prince Waleed,” *Khaleej Times*, December 6, 2005 (Available at http://www.khaleejtimes.com/Displayarticle.asp?section=theuae&xfile=data/theuae/2005/december/theuae_december146.xml).

⁶⁵ Posner, *Secretes of the Kingdom*, p. 173; Ottaway, “U.S. Eyes Money Trails of Saudi-Backed Charities.”

⁶⁶ Annual Report of The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, May 2004, p. 71 (Available at <http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/publications/currentreport/2004annualRpt.pdf>).

⁶⁷ Dore Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom*, pp. 4-5.

⁶⁸ Mohamed Charfi, “Reaching the Next Muslim Generation,” *The New York Times*, March 12, 2002 (Available at <http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F20F1EF73C5D0C718DDDA0894DA404482>).

⁶⁹ Roe, Cohen and Franklin, “How Saudi wealth fueled holy war”; Senator Bob Graham with Jeff Nussbaum, *Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America’s War on Terror* (New York: Random House 2004), p. 27.

⁷⁰ Baer, *Sleeping With the Devil*, p. 100.

Another estimate put the amount provided directly by the Saudi government from 1980 through 1990 at \$4 billion, but this excluded funds given by private individuals and charities. Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom*, p. 127.

⁷¹ Weaver, “Blowback.”

⁷² “Osama Bin Laden v. The U.S.: Edicts and Statements,” online supplement to “Hunting Bin Laden,” PBS *Frontline*, (Available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/edicts.html#feb22>); Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom*, p. 130.

⁷³ Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, “Was U.S. Aiding the Taliban?,” PoliticsOL.com, September 18, 2001 (Available at <http://www.politicsol.com/guest-commentaries/2001-09-18.html>).

⁷⁴ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, pp. 56-57.

⁷⁵ See also Ahmed Rashid, “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1999 (Available at <http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/Rashid99.html>); Weaver, “Blowback.”

⁷⁶ Gerald Posner, *Why America Slept: The Failure to Prevent 9/11* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), p. 117. See also Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam*, pp. 199-200.

⁷⁷ Posner, *Why America Slept*, p. 117.

⁷⁸ Rohrabacher, “Was U.S. Aiding the Taliban?”

⁷⁹ Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom*, pp. 132-33.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁸¹ Recall also that Saudi dissident Ali al-Ahmed has offered the exact same assessment regarding Wahhabi violence against Shiites, as we saw in Part 2. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

⁸² Rohrabacher, “Was U.S. Aiding the Taliban?”

⁸³ Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom*, p. 131; Jeffrey Goldberg, “Inside Jihad U.,” *The New York Times Magazine*, June 25, 2000 (Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/20000625mag-taliban.html>).

⁸⁴ Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom*, p. 131; Goldberg, “Inside Jihad U.”; Thomas L. Friedman, “In Pakistan, Its Jihad 101,” *The New York Times*, November 13, 2001 (Available at <http://www.pulitzer.org/year/2002/commentary/works/111301.html>).

⁸⁵ Goldberg, “Inside Jihad U.”

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Friedman, “In Pakistan, Its Jihad 101.” The Saudis set up another prominent school in Pakistan, the International Islamic University, as a front for jihadist operations reaching into Afghanistan. Sheikh Abdullah Azzam was allegedly a teacher there. And Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, attended the school before his capture in 1995. Pakistan’s Interior Minister would subsequently describe the University as “a haven for Islamic terrorists.” Weaver, “Blowback.”

⁸⁹ Note that the acronyms are derived from the French names of these organizations, hence the discrepancy between the acronyms and their most commonly used English names.

⁹⁰ Hal Bernton, Mike Carter, David Heath and James Neff, “The Terrorist Within,” *The Seattle Times*, June 23 - July 7, 2002 (Available at <http://seattletimes.nwsourc.com/news/nation-world/terroristwithin/chapter3.html>). See also Paul McGeough, “Zarqawi: the new bin Laden,” *The Sydney Morning Herald*, October 17, 2004 (“The emerging pattern of violence in Iraq is dishearteningly similar to the Algerian civil war of the 1990s. That was a conflict that claimed more than 60,000 lives in an unbridled application of Salafi-sanctioned Muslim-on-Muslim violence.”) (Available at <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/10/16/1097784103533.html>).

⁹¹ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, p. 162.

⁹² Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom*, p. 174.

⁹³ James A. Phillips, “The Rising Threat of Revolutionary Islam in Algeria,” The Heritage Foundation, November 9, 1995 (Available at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Africa/BG1060.cfm>).

⁹⁴ Gerth and Miller, “Saudis Called Slow to Help Stem Terror Finances.”

⁹⁵ Steve Coll, “Global Network Provides Money, Haven,” *The Washington Post*, August 3, 1993 (Available at <http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/72176321.html?dids=72176321:72176321&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&fmac=&date=Aug+3%2C+1993&author=Steve+Coll&desc=Global+Network+Provides+Money%2C+Haven+Series%3A+ISLAMIC+WARRIORS+Series+Number%3A+2%2F2>).

⁹⁶ Harvey Morris and Jimmy Burns, “Attacks aided by ‘privatization of terrorism,’” *The Financial Times*, September 23, 2001 (Available at <http://specials.ft.com/aoa/FT35IEH7ZRC.html>). See also Kaplan, “The Saudi Connection” (“But by 1994, Riyadh was starting to get complaints—from the French interior minister about Saudi funds reaching Algerian terrorists and from President Clinton about their funding of Hamas, whose suicide bombers were wreaking havoc on the Middle East peace process.”)

⁹⁷ Simpson, “U.S. Officials Knew of Ties Between Terror, Charities.” See also Kaplan, “The Saudi Connection” (“A CIA investigation found that a third of the Islamic charities in the Balkans—among them the IIRO—had ‘facilitated the activities of Islamic groups that engage in terrorism,’ including . . . Algerian extremists”).

⁹⁸ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, pp. 162-63, 166.

⁹⁹ Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom*, p. 13.

¹⁰⁰ Brian Eads, “Saudi Arabia’s deadly export,” *Reader’s Digest* (Australia), February 2003 (Available at <http://www.multiline.com.au/~johnm/submit/saudi.htm>). See also Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam* (“Another major arena for recruitment of Wahhabi terrorists in the 1990s was Algeria . . . A brutal civil war between the state, moderate Islamists, and Wahhabis, the latter enlisted in the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), had its origins in the constitutional crisis of 1991.”); Jamaluddin B. Hoffman, “Guide to Wahhabi Organizations in North America,” Center for Policing Terrorism, p. 15 (“The Armed Islamic Group is an exceptionally violent Wahhabist

organization. It sprang onto the Algerian political landscape with a wave of terrorist attacks and massacres in 1992 after that nation's secular authorities refused to accept the electoral victory of the affiliated Islamic Salvation Front in 1991.”) (Available at <http://www.cpt-mi.org/WahabbiOragnziationsNorthAmerica.pdf>); “Saudi Arabia Debate – Part 1,” *EurabianTimes.com*, March 26, 2005 (“In Algeria, the GIA and GSPC leaders [investigative journalist Jason Burke] spoke to had their education in Saudi Islamic schools.”) (Available at http://www.eurabiantimes.com/archives/2005/03/saudi_arabia_de.php).

¹⁰¹ Lawrence Joffe, “Obituary: Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin,” *The Guardian* (London), June 21, 2004 (Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/saudi/story/0,,1243647,00.html>).

¹⁰² Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, pp. 183-85.

¹⁰³ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 13; Esther Pan, “Background Q&A – Africa: Terror Havens,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 20, 2003 (Available at <http://www.cfr.org/publication/7716/africa.html?breadcrumb=default>). See also “Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996,” United States Department of State (“At least 60,000 Algerians-Islamic militants, civilians, and security personnel-have been killed since the insurgency began in 1992.”) (Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_96/middle.html).

¹⁰⁴ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 143.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* See also Epstein, “Trails Lead to Saudis.” Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Coconspirator Statements, *United States v. Enaam M. Arnaout*, No. 02 CR 892 (N.D.III. January 6, 2003), p. 68 (Available at <http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/bif/usarnaout10603prof.pdf>).

¹⁰⁷ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 144.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 143; Statement of Steven Emerson, Third Public Hearing of The National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, July 9, 2003 (Available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing3/witness_emerson.htm); Erik Stakelback, “The Saudi Hate Machine,” *In the National Interest*, December 19, 2003 (Available at <http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/Printable.asp?ID=11388>).

¹⁰⁹ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, pp. 143-44.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*; Hedges, “Muslims From Afar Joining ‘Holy War’ in Bosnia.”

¹¹¹ Joffe, “Obituary: Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin.”

¹¹² Government’s Evidentiary Proffer, *United States v. Enaam M. Arnaout*, pp. 19, 24, 65.

¹¹³ Hedges, “Muslims From Afar Joining ‘Holy War’ in Bosnia.”

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 145. For a fuller account of the “mosque wars” between the Wahhabis and the native Muslims in the Blakans, see Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam*, pp. 202-11.

¹¹⁵ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, pp. 145-46.

¹¹⁶ Beyer and MacLeod, “Inside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”; Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 213.

¹¹⁷ Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam*, pp. 204-05.

¹¹⁸ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, pp. 147, 154.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*; Complaint, *Thomas Burnett, Sr., et al. v. Al Baraka Investment and Development Corporation*, No. 02-1616 (JR) (D.C. 2002) p. 193 (Available at <http://news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/terrorism/burnettba81502cmp.pdf>).

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*; Posner, *Secrets of the Kingdom*, pp. 169-70.

¹²¹ Baer, *Sleeping with the Devil*, p. 20.

¹²² Testimony of Emerson and Levin before the United States Senate, July 31, 2003; Baer, *Sleeping with the Devil*, p. 20.

¹²³ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 146; Testimony of Emerson and Levin before the United States Senate, July 31, 2003.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 172. See also Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam*, p. 206.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 210.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 208; Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 146.

¹²⁷ Interview with Stephen Schwartz, "The Good and the Bad," *National Review*, November 18, 2002 (Available at <http://www.nationalreview.com/interrogatory/interrogatory111802.asp>).

¹²⁸ Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam*, p. 209. Schwartz also noted the sectarian source for much of the friction:

Wahhabi hatred of music and Sufism both ran counter to Balkan Muslim traditions. Balkan Muslims are especially devoted to a practice that drives Wahhabis to fury: *mawlid an-nabi*, or, as it is locally called, *mevlud*, the commemoration of Muhammad's birth.

Ibid., p. 207.

¹²⁹ Ibid. p. 211.

¹³⁰ "Son of Al Qaeda," PBS *Frontline*, original airdate April 22, 2004 (Available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/khadr/>).

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Sharon LaFraniere, "How Jihad Made Its Way to Chechnya," *The Washington Post*, April 26, 2003 (Available at <http://www.mindfully.org/Reform/2003/Jihad-In-Chechnya26apr03.htm>); Uwe Klussmann and Walter Mayr, "Unbridled Terror," *The New York Times*, September 6, 2004 (Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/06/international/europe/06SPIEGEL2.html?ei=5070&en=d78dc21a94ccbe1f&ex=1134018000&adxnml=1&adxnmlx=1133903521-IRZ3RGDqSsWEzU+B6cB9Qw>); Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam*, pp. 231-32.

¹³³ Stephen Schwartz, "The Road from Riyadh to Beslan," *The Weekly Standard*, September 20, 2004 (Available at <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Protected/Articles/000/000/004/614xefik.asp>).

¹³⁴ LaFraniere, "How Jihad Made Its Way to Chechnya."

¹³⁵ "Chechens' Terror Links Drawing Attention," Associated Press, September 27, 2004 (Available at http://www.zwire.com/site/news.cfm?BRD=1078&dept_id=151021&newsid=13009211&PAG=461&rfti=9).

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ LaFraniere, "How Jihad Made Its Way to Chechnya."

¹³⁸ Nick Paton Walsh, "Mystery still shrouds Beslan six months on," *The Guardian* (London), February 16, 2005 (Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,2763,1415415,00.html>); "Timeline: the Beslan school siege," *The Guardian* (London), September 6, 2004 (Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,2763,1296826,00.html>).

¹³⁹ "Putin meets angry Beslan mothers," BBC News, September 2, 2005 (Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4207112.stm>).

¹⁴⁰ Walsh, "Mystery still shrouds Beslan six months on."

¹⁴¹ "Chechens' Terror Links Drawing Attention," Associated Press; Klussmann and Mayr, "Unbridled Terror"; James Meek, "Three militants taken alive as Al-Qaida blamed," *The Guardian* (London), September 4, 2004 (Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1297156,00.html>).

Note that other reports have linked yet another Saudi identified as "Abu Havs" to the attack, although this may be just another alias of Abu Omar al-Seif. See Mark Franchetti, "Saudi killer spearheads Chechen war," *The Sunday Times* (London), March 13, 2005 (Available at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-1522790,00.html>).

¹⁴² Nick Paton Walsh, "Saudi link to Beslan militant," *The Guardian* (London), September 1, 2005 (Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1560100,00.html>).

¹⁴³ Many of the Saudi clerics promoting violence in Chechnya were the same clerics whose violent and xenophobic rhetoric we saw in Part 2, including Sheikh Hamud bin Uqla al-Shuaibi and Sheikh Sulaiman bin Nasr al-Ulwan. Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, pp. 139, 142.

¹⁴⁴ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 142; LaFraniere, "How Jihad Made Its Way to Chechnya"; Government's Evidentiary Proffer, *United States v. Enaam M. Arnaout*, pp. 25, 75, 78, 81, 89.

¹⁴⁵ LaFraniere, "How Jihad Made Its Way to Chechnya." See also Kaplan, "The Saudi Connection."

¹⁴⁶ LaFraniere, "How Jihad Made Its Way to Chechnya." See also Government's Evidentiary Proffer, *United States v. Enaam M. Arnaout*, p. 25.

¹⁴⁷ Baer, *Sleeping with the Devil*, pp. 146-47.

¹⁴⁸ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 138.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 139; LaFraniere, "How Jihad Made Its Way to Chechnya"; Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam*, p. 233.

¹⁵⁰ Note that Al-Obaid has since been appointed the Kingdom's education minister. Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 139.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

¹⁵² LaFraniere, "How Jihad Made Its Way to Chechnya."

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 141.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 142; Gutaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, p. 91; LaFraniere, "How Jihad Made Its Way to Chechnya."

¹⁵⁶ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 141.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

¹⁶⁰ As Stephen Schwartz bluntly stated, "The IMU is a classic Wahhabi combat organization – a murderous gang of fanatics bent on imposing Saudi-backed Islamofascism." Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam*, p. 225.

¹⁶¹ Baer, *Sleeping with the Devil*, pp. 143-47.

¹⁶² Robert Baer, *See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism* (Three Rivers Press: New York 2002), p. 165. See also Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam*, p. 224.

¹⁶³ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 135.

¹⁶⁴ Government's Evidentiary Proffer, *United States v. Enaam M. Arnaout*, p. 93.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ As noted in Part 2, the word "Wahhabi" is really a western term of art. The term used by the Saudis themselves, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood and other ideologically affiliated groups, is "Salafi". All Salafis share a desire to turn back the historical clock to the glory days of the Islamic caliphate, as well as an affinity for the teachings of Ibn Taimiyyah. What distinguishes the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, if anything, is their more modern ideological antecedents. For Wahhabis the most important is, of course, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. For the Muslim Brotherhood the most important are the twentieth century scholars Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. The prominence of these two modern writers is what has made the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood stand out among the various Salafi groups.

As Robert Baer noted, at base the Saudi Wahhabis and the Muslim Brotherhood are factions of the same ideological movement. In a similar vein, Stephen Schwartz has referred to the Muslim Brotherhood as "neo-Wahhabis". Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood is essentially the political arm of the Wahhabi/Salafi ideological movement as it has manifested itself in Muslim countries outside Saudi Arabia. For the sake of simplicity, I have consistently referred to this ideology generally as "Wahhabism".

¹⁶⁷ Baer, *Sleeping with the Devil*, p. 126. See also Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, pp. 89-91, 126. See also "House of Saud," PBS *Frontline* ("King Faisal made Saudi Arabia a sanctuary for extremist Muslims from abroad. When

governments in Egypt and Syria cracked down on fundamentalist religious scholars, King Faisal invited them to teach Saudi Arabian youth.”)

¹⁶⁸ Baer, *Sleeping with the Devil*, p. 127.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 94; Posner, *Secrets of the Kingdom*, p. 37; Weaver, “Blowback.”

¹⁷¹ Lawrence Wright, “The Man Behind Bin Laden,” *The New Yorker*, September 16, 2002 (Available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/020916fa_fact2e -and- http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/020916fa_fact2f).

¹⁷² Ibid.; Dore Gold, “Saudi Arabia’s Dubious Denials of Involvement in International Terrorism,” *Jerusalem Viewpoints*, October 1, 2003 (Available at <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp504.htm>).

¹⁷³ Another factor affecting the relationship between the Egyptians and the Saudis could be their respective sense of national identity. Egypt is a much larger and predominantly working class country. On the other hand, the indigenous population of Saudi Arabia is relatively small and spoiled by the easy money of its oil fields, as evidenced by the high number of foreign workers in the Kingdom (including many Egyptians). Thus, one can see how the Egyptians could garner a reputation as the doers, with a work ethic and practical knowledge that the Saudis might have lacked (or were perceived to lack). Journalist Lawrence Wright seems to have observed this phenomenon in his exposés on Al Qaeda. For instance, an Egyptian filmmaker who did documentaries during the conflict with the Soviets informed him that, “The people with Zawahiri had extraordinary capabilities—doctors, engineers, soldiers. They had experience in secret work. They knew how to organize themselves and create cells. And they became the leaders.” And according to one leader of the foreign fighters in Afghanistan, while there were only around five hundred Egyptians directly involved in the fighting, “They were known as the thinkers and the brains.” However, this may have changed over time as the Saudis gained experience and confidence. Consider the fact that most of the foot soldiers involved in executing the 1993 World Trade Center bombing were Egyptian. But since that time, almost all of the operatives actually executing the major attacks on the U.S. have been Saudi nationals, as detailed in Part 1. Wright, “The Man Behind Bin Laden.”

¹⁷⁴ Kate Connolly, “Saudi-funded school in Germany ‘linked to terrorist attacks’,” *The Telegraph* (London), December 24, 2003 (Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/10/24/wsaud24.xml>).

¹⁷⁵ Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, “Terror 101: Are the Saudis funding schools devoted to fomenting radical Islamic ideology?,” *Newsweek*, December 3, 2003 (Available at <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3660811/>).

¹⁷⁶ “Study Says Controversial School Teaches Hate” Deutsche Welle, June 2004 (Available at <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1245760,00.html>).

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Connolly, “Saudi-funded school in Germany ‘linked to terrorist attacks’.”

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Isikoff and Hosenball, “Terror 101: Are the Saudis funding schools devoted to fomenting radical Islamic ideology?”

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Michael Isikoff with Stefan Theil, “How High Do They Go?” *Newsweek*, May 5, 2003 (Available at <http://www.keeppmedia.com/pubs/Newsweek/2003/05/05/308262?extID=10026>); “Top Saudi Diplomat at Berlin Embassy Frequently Met With Suspected Al Qaeda Cell Leader at Berlin Mosque,” PRNewswire, April 6, 2003 (Available at <http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/04-06-2003/0001920820&EDATE>).

¹⁸⁴ Isikoff and Theil, “How High Do They Go?”; “Top Saudi Diplomat at Berlin Embassy Frequently Met With Suspected Al Qaeda Cell Leader at Berlin Mosque,” PRNewswire; Baer, *Sleeping with the Devil*, p. 21.

¹⁸⁵ Peter Finn, "Hamburg Suspect Linked to Saudi Diplomat," *The Washington Post*, December 4, 2002 (Available at <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/12/04/1038950095855.html>).

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.; Isikoff and Theil, "How High Do They Go?"

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.; "Top Saudi Diplomat at Berlin Embassy Frequently Met With Suspected Al Qaeda Cell Leader at Berlin Mosque," PRNewswire; Testimony of Matthew Levitt before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, September 10, 2003 (Available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=13>).

¹⁸⁸ David Crawford, "How a Diplomat from Saudi Arabia Spread his Faith," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 10, 2003 (Available at <http://www.moralgroup.com/NewsItems/Islam/p12.htm>).

¹⁸⁹ "Top Saudi Diplomat at Berlin Embassy Frequently Met With Suspected Al Qaeda Cell Leader at Berlin Mosque," PRNewswire. See also Crawford, "How a Diplomat from Saudi Arabia Spread his Faith" ("[O]n March 22, the German Foreign Ministry, following a recommendation from the country's domestic-intelligence service, told the Saudi Embassy that Mr. Fakihi's diplomatic accreditation would be withdrawn unless he left the country, according to a senior German official.")

¹⁹⁰ Isikoff and Theil, "How High Do They Go?"

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Peter Finn and Glenn Frankel, "Al Qaeda Link to Attacks in London Probed," *The Washington Post*, August 1, 2005 (Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/31/AR2005073100624_pf.html).

¹⁹³ Ibid.; "British Seeking Cleric's Top Aide in July 7 Attack," *The New York Times*, July 21, 2005 (Available at <http://www.freemuslims.org/news/article.php?article=791>).

¹⁹⁴ Finn and Frankel, "Al Qaeda Link to Attacks in London Probed."

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Duncan Gardham, "Two bomb suspects shared a flat," *The Telegraph* (London), July 26, 2005 (Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/07/26/nbomb126.xml&sSheet=/news/2005/07/26/ixnewstop.html>).

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.; "Cops Probe London Suspects' Saudi Ties," Fox News (Associated Press), July 31, 2005 (Available at <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,164289,00.html>).

¹⁹⁹ Finn and Frankel, "Al Qaeda Link to Attacks in London Probed."

²⁰⁰ "At-a-glance: 7 July reports," BBC News, May 12, 2006 (Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4764427.stm>).

²⁰¹ Finn and Frankel, "Al Qaeda Link to Attacks in London Probed."

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Anthony Barnett, "UK was warned of July suicide attacks," *The Observer* (London), February 5, 2006 (Available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1702660,00.html); Sam Lyon, "Attack warning 'months ago'," *The Evening Standard* (London), September 2, 2005 (Available at http://www.looksmartscience.com/p/articles/mi_qn4153/is_20050902/ai_n15334101).

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Letta Tayler, "A common thread?" *Newsday*, July 28, 2005 (Available at <http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/world/ny-womosq284361085jul28,0,5820338,print.story>).

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²⁰⁷ Jason Burke, "AK-47 training held at London mosque," *The Observer* (London), February 17, 2002 (Available at <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/islam/story/0,1442,651748,00.html>); Tayler, "A common thread?"; R.

Reid and Keith B. Richburg, "Shoe Bomb Suspect's Journey Into Al Qaeda," *The Washington Post*, March 31, 2002 (Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A41327-2002Mar30¬Found=true>); "Al Qaeda's New Front," PBS *Frontline*, original airdate January 25, 2005 (Available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/etc/script.html>).

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²⁰⁹ "Al Qaeda's New Front," PBS *Frontline*.

²¹⁰ Rory Carroll and Brian Whitaker, "Kidnappers Call to London," *The Guardian* (London), January 14, 1999 (Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/yemen/Story/0,2763,209196,00.html>).

²¹¹ Mahan Abedin, "Al-Muhajiroun in the UK: an Interview with Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed," The Jamestown Foundation, March 23, 2004 (Available at http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=38#).

²¹² Ibid.; Dan Verton, "Update: Omar Bakri Muhammad, bin Laden's man in London," *Computerworld*, November 18, 2002 (Available at <http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/cybercrime/story/0,10801,76007,00.html>).

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²¹⁴ Verton, "Update: Omar Bakri Muhammad, bin Laden's man in London"; "Bush Opposes 9/11 Query Panel," CBS News, May 23, 2002 (Available at <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/05/15/attack/main509096.shtml>). See also Statement of Dan Verton before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, February 24, 2004 (Available at http://kyl.senate.gov/legis_center/subdocs/022404_verton.pdf).

²¹⁵ Note that, although Bakri was allegedly expelled from the Kingdom by the Saudi government because of his extremist views, it is certainly remarkable that he would immediately take up residence in a Saudi-built mosque where his activities would be financed by wealthy Saudi citizens. Thair Shaikh, "London to host Islamic 'celebration' of Sept 11," *The Telegraph* (London), August 9, 2002 (Available at <http://news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2002/09/08/nextre08.xml>); Abedin, "Al-Muhajiroun in the UK: an Interview with Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed."

²¹⁶ Shaikh, "London to host Islamic 'celebration' of Sept 11."

²¹⁷ Ibid.

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²²⁰ "Controversial religious leader defends terror," BBC News, April 5, 2004 (Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2004/04_april/05/suicide_bombers.shtml).

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²²² "Police avert car bomb 'carnage'," BBC News, June 29, 2007 (Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6252276.stm); "Blazing car crashes into airport," BBC News, June 30, 2007 (Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/6257194.stm).

²²³ "London Mayor defends Muslims as bomb plot foiled," Agence France Presse, June 30, 2007 (Available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070630/wl_uk_afp/britainattacksmayorsaudimuslims_070630103208).

²²⁴ "'Terror ringleader' is brilliant NHS doctor," *The Daily Mail* (London), July 2, 2007 (Available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=465481&in_page_id=1770&ct=5); Ranya Kadri and Borzou Daragahi, "British bomb plot arrest stuns family," *The Los Angeles Times*, July 3, 2007 (Available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-asha3jul03_0,3219619.story?coll=la-home-center); Marjorie Miller and Sebastian Rotella, "British suspect's beliefs drove him, friends say," *The Los Angeles Times*, July 5, 2007 (Available at [52](http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-</p></div><div data-bbox=)

[abdullah5jul05_0_5704345_story?coll=la-home-center](http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/article2730423.ece)); Kim Sengupta, Ian Herbert and Cahal Milmo, "Terror plot hatched in British hospitals," *The Independent* (London), July 7, 2007 (Available at <http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/article2730423.ece>).

²²⁵ Kim Sengupta and Kathy Marks, "Police identify bomb-maker as Iraqi becomes first man to be charged over terror attacks," *The Belfast Telegraph*, July 7, 2007 (Available at <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/article2743076.ece>); Darshna Soni, "UK terror suspect charged," Channel 4 News, July 6, 2007 (Available at <http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/uk/uk%20terror%20suspect%20charged/590512>).

²²⁶ Richard Elias, "From Baghdad with Hate," *The Scotsman*, July 8, 2007 (Available at <http://news.scotsman.com/opinion.cfm?id=1063622007>).

²²⁷ Testimony of Emerson and Levin before the United States Senate, July 31, 2003.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ "Country Reports on Terrorism," United States Department of State, April 30, 2007 (Available at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82734.htm>).

²³⁰ "Saudi-based NRIs funded Mumbai blasts: ATS," *The Times of India*, August 2, 2006 (Available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Mumbai_hunt/Saudi-based_NRIs_funded_Mumbai_blasts_ATS/articleshow/1838830.cms). See also Sagnik Chowdhury, "Cops identify Saudi man who routed hawala money to LeT's Mumbai chief," *The Sunday Express* (India), August 4, 2006 (Available at <http://www.indianexpress.com/iep/sunday/story/9767.html>); Sagnik Chowdhury, "Lashkar suspect got hawala money via Saudi: Mumbai ATS," *The Sunday Express* (India), August 2, 2006 (Available at <http://www.indianexpress.com/iep/sunday/story/9708.html>);

²³¹ The report further explained:

The Saudi influence here is relatively new. As part of an effort to cultivate Islamic leaders, the former authoritarian ruler, President Suharto, encouraged a Saudi presence in Indonesia in the decade before he was toppled in 1998.

For years, more than 200,000 Indonesians have made the annual hajj, the pilgrimage to Islam's holy sites in Saudi Arabia. Many others have taken charter flights to Riyadh, the Saudi capital, to find work as maids and laborers. But after returning home, most Indonesians continued with their inclusive brand of Islam, which tolerates a smattering of Sufism here and a touch of Buddhism there.

But as the Indonesian state has become increasingly unable to look after basic needs – the unemployment rate is about 20 percent – growing numbers of Indonesians are finding some of the stricter tenets of Saudi Arabia's Islam more attractive.

Jane Perlez, "Saudis Quietly Promote Strict Islam in Indonesia," *The New York Times*, July 5, 2003 (Available at <http://www.hvk.org/articles/0703/43.html>).

²³² Ibid.; Dan Murphy, "Who's radicalizing Indonesia's schools?," *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 16, 2003 (Available at <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0916/p07s01-woap.html>).

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Perlez, "Saudis Quietly Promote Strict Islam in Indonesia." The report went on to note:

The religious affairs attaché also offers scholarships for study to Saudi Arabian universities, and the students who receive them are increasingly those with a conservative religious bent, Indonesian officials said.

Students affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest, oldest and most inclusive Islamic organization in Indonesia, said they had been excluded from scholarships to study in Saudi Arabia because they refused, in interviews with Saudi education officials, to cut their ties with the group.

Ibid.

²³⁵ Posner, *Secrets of the Kingdom*, p. 172; Kaplan, "The Saudi Connection."

²³⁶ Perlez, “Saudis Quietly Promote Strict Islam in Indonesia.”

²³⁷ Testimony of Brisard before the United States Senate, October 22, 2003, p. 18. *See also* “U.S., Saudi Arabia Freeze Assets of Saudi Charity Branch Offices,” United States Department of State, January 22, 2004 (Available at <http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004&m=January&x=20040122165212MBzemoG8.684939e-02&t=usinfo/wf-latest.html>); Perlez, “Saudis Quietly Promote Strict Islam in Indonesia”; David E. Kaplan, “Playing Offense: The inside story of how U.S. terrorist hunters are going after al Qaeda,” *U.S. News & World Report*, June 2, 2003 (Available at <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/030602/2terror.htm>); Zachary Abuza, “Asia Hasn’t Stopped the Terror Funding,” *Asian Wall Street Journal*, October 1, 2003 (Available at <http://www.newamericancentury.org/eastasia-20031001.htm>).

²³⁸ Murphy, “Who’s radicalizing Indonesia’s schools?”

²³⁹ “Mourners remember Bali victims,” CNN News, October 12, 2003 (Available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/10/12/bali.memorials/>).

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Maria Ressa, “Terrorisms new frontline,” CNN News, October 29, 2002 (Available at <http://cgi.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/10/29/asia.jihad.3/>); Dan Murphy, “Investigation into Bali blast moves forward,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, October 18, 2002 (Available at <http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1018/p08s01-woap.html?related>).

²⁴² Al-Faruq appears to be the replacement of Al Qaeda’s previous point person in the region, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, who is further discussed above. Mark Husband, “Saudi link to Bali blast, says al-Qaeda prisoner,” *The Financial Times*, October 16, 2002 (Available at <http://www.infd.be/bali%20tragedy%20updates%2016Oct02.doc>); Ressa, “Terrorisms new frontline”; Murphy, “Investigation into Bali blast moves forward”; Anna Melman, “Bombers in our backyard,” *The Review*, August 2002 (Available at <http://www.aijac.org.au/review/2003/288/ji-288.html>); Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, p. xxxvi.

²⁴³ Murphy, “Investigation into Bali blast moves forward”; Husband, “Saudi link to Bali blast, says al-Qaeda prisoner.”

²⁴⁴ Murphy, “Investigation into Bali blast moves forward”; Husband, “Saudi link to Bali blast, says al-Qaeda prisoner”; Ressa, “Terrorisms new frontline”; Simon Elegant, “Megawati Sukarnoputri is finally making moves to combat terrorism, but the war has only just begun,” *Time*, October 28, 2002 (Available at <http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/1101021028/investigation.html>); Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, p. xxxvi.

²⁴⁵ Ressa, “Terrorisms new frontline.”

²⁴⁶ Charles A. Radin, “Conflict hits Indonesia hard,” *The Boston Globe*, May 9, 2005 (Available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2005/05/09/conflict_hits_indonesia_hard_extremists_rock_tolerant_nation?pg=full); Murphy, “Who’s radicalizing Indonesia’s schools?”

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Kaplan, “Playing Offense: The inside story of how U.S. terrorist hunters are going after al Qaeda.”

²⁴⁹ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, p. 268; Elegant, “Megawati Sukarnoputri is finally making moves to combat terrorism, but the war has only just begun.”

²⁵⁰ Ibid.; Elegant, “Megawati Sukarnoputri is finally making moves to combat terrorism, but the war has only just begun.”

²⁵¹ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, p. 269.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom*, p. 218.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ “Saudi Time Bomb?” *PBS Frontline*.

²⁵⁶ Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom*, p. 218.

²⁵⁷ “Background Q & A: Ansar al-Islam (Iraq, Islamists/Kurdish Separatists),” Council on Foreign Relations, November 2005 (Available at <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9237/>); “Profile: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” BBC News, November 10, 2005 (Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3483089.stm).

²⁵⁸ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 216.

²⁵⁹ Stephen Schwartz, “Saudi Mischief in Fallujah,” *The Weekly Standard*, June 16, 2003 (Available at http://www.defenddemocracy.org/in_the_media/in_the_media_show.htm?doc_id=176721).

²⁶⁰ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 217. See also Ali al-Ahmed and Haydar Hamdani, “Sources: Saudis Behind Iraq Car Bombings,” Saudi Information Agency, September 25, 2003 (“SIA news has identified several Saudis killed in Iraq fighting US and Iraqi troops since April. They include Abdul Aziz Saud al-Gharbi, 22, born in the northern city of Hail. He was the suicide bomber who killed five people, including an Australian journalist March 22, in Northern Iraq, his relatives told SIS.”) (Available at <http://www.arabiaradio.org/english/article.cfm?qid=122&sid=2>).

²⁶¹ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 219; Schwartz, “Saudi Mischief in Fallujah.”

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 220.

²⁶⁴ “Saudi Arabia Sends Aid to Residents of Iraqi Rebel Bastion,” Agence France Presse, June 10, 2004 (Available at <http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jun2004-daily/11-06-2004/main/update.shtml#18>); Alfred B. Prados, “Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, June 17, 2005, p. 4 (Available at http://www.ndu.edu/library/docs/crs/crs_ib93113_17jun05.pdf).

²⁶⁵ Dan Murphy, “In Iraq: a clear-cut bin Laden-Zarqawi alliance,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 30, 2004 (Available at <http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1230/p01s03-woiq.html>); McGeough, “Zarqawi: the new bin Laden”; Stephen Schwartz, “Murderous Monotheists,” *The Weekly Standard*, October 11, 2004 (Available at <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/004/723apdkj.asp?pg=1>).

²⁶⁶ His mentor was Abu Mohammed Al-Maqdisi, a highly influential Wahhabi cleric from Kuwait who had been operating out of Jordan. McGeough, “Zarqawi: the new bin Laden.”

²⁶⁷ “Profile: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” BBC News; Murphy, “In Iraq: a clear-cut bin Laden-Zarqawi alliance.”

²⁶⁸ Schwartz, “Murderous Monotheists.”

²⁶⁹ “Communiqué No. (6) Issued by Zarqawi's ‘Attawhid and Jihad Group’ - Military Department,” SITE Institute, May 17, 2004 (Available at <http://siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications3704&Category=publications&Subcategory=0>).

²⁷⁰ Reuven Paz, “Arab volunteers killed in Iraq: an Analysis,” The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements Series on Global Jihad, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 4, 2005 (Available at http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_no_1_vol_3_-_Arabs_killed_in_Iraq.pdf).

²⁷¹ John Ward Anderson and Hasan Shammari, “Iraq Says Syria Harbors Foreign Killers,” *The Washington Post*, November 14, 2005 (Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/13/AR2005111300466.html>); R. James Woolsey, “The Elephant in the Middle East Living Room,” *National Review*, December 14, 2005 (Available at <http://www.nationalreview.com/woolsey/woolsey.asp>). More recently, these reports have been confirmed by officials at the Pentagon:

About 45% of all foreign militants targeting U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians and security forces are from Saudi Arabia; 15% are from Syria and Lebanon; and 10% are from North Africa, according to official U.S. military figures made available to The Times by the senior officer. Nearly half of the 135 foreigners in U.S. detention facilities in Iraq are Saudis, he said.

Fighters from Saudi Arabia are thought to have carried out more suicide bombings than those of any other nationality, said the senior U.S. officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the subject's sensitivity. . . . In the last six months, such bombings have killed or injured 4,000 Iraqis.

Ned Parker, "Saudis' role in Iraq insurgency outlined," *The Los Angeles Times*, July 15, 2007 (Available at <http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-fg-saudi15jul15.1.6916057.story?track=crosspromo&coll=la-headlines-frontpage&ctrack=1&cset=true>).

²⁷² "Report: Mess-hall suicide bomber was Saudi: Arab newspaper says medical student killed 22 people", MSNBC.com (Associated Press), January 3, 2005 (Available at <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6782944/>); "Newspaper: Saudi was Mess Tent Bomber," *The Washington Times* (UPI), January 3, 2005 (Available at <http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20050103-023447-4988r.htm>); Stephen Schwartz, "The Mosul Massacre, Courtesy of the Saudis," *The New York Post*, January 6, 2005 (Available at <http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=16547>).

²⁷³ "The Insurgents," PBS *Frontline*, original airdate February 21, 2006 (Available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/insurgency/etc/script.html>).

²⁷⁴ Schwartz, "Murderous Monotheists."

²⁷⁵ Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, "Who is Abu Zaraqawi?", *The Weekly Standard*, May 24, 2004 (Available at <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/004/094npvzg.asp?pg=1>); Peter Grier and Faye Bowers, "Is Al Qaeda stoking Sunni-Shiite civil war?", *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 4, 2004 (Available at <http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0304/p03s01-woiq.html>).

²⁷⁶ McGeough, "Zaraqawi: the new bin Laden."

²⁷⁷ As *The Weekly Standard* reported:

The slaughter of Shias touches on another Zaraqawi beef with bin Laden. While both men follow the strict code of Salafi Islam, which reckons Shias as apostates, bin Laden prides himself on being a unifying figure and has made tactical alliances with Shia groups, meeting several times with Shia militants. Zaraqawi, by contrast, favors butchering Shias, calling them "the most evil of mankind . . . the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom." American military officials hold Zaraqawi responsible not only for assassinating Shia religious leaders in Iraq, but also for the multiple truck bombings of a Shia religious festival this past March, which killed 143 worshippers.

Leiken and Brooke, "Who is Abu Zaraqawi?"

²⁷⁸ "Saudi telethon raises \$77 million," CNN News, January 7, 2005 (Available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/01/06/saudi.telethon/>). In addition, the Congressional Research Service has estimated the amount of Saudi government support for the Palestinian Authority at \$80 to \$100 million per year. Alfred B. Prados and Christopher M. Blanchard, "Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues," Congressional Research Service, December 8, 2004, p. 8 (Available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32499.pdf>).

²⁷⁹ Kaplan, "The Saudi Connection." See also Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam*, pp. 238-40.

²⁸⁰ "News Conference With Adel Al-Jubeir, Adviser To The Saudi Crown Prince," Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, June 12, 2003 (Available at <http://www.saudiembassy.net/StatementLink/03-ST-Adel-embassy-0612-transcript.asp>).

²⁸¹ Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 265; Testimony of Jean-Charles Brisard before the United States Senate, October 22, 2003, p. 9.

²⁸² " Hamas takes full control of Gaza," BBC News, June 15, 2007 (Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6755299.stm); Nidal al-Mughrabi, " Hamas gunment hunt down Fatah rivals in Gaza strip," Reuters, June 14, 2007 (Available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL1474926320070614>).

²⁸³ Ilhem Rachidi, "Morocco struggles with Wahhabi legacy," *Asia Times*, April 16, 2004 (Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/FD16Aa01.html).

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

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- ²⁸⁶ Ibid.; Rachidi, "Morocco struggles with Wahhabi legacy."
- ²⁸⁷ Ibid.; Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*, p. 213; Peter Finn and Keith B. Richburg, "Madrid Probe Turns to Islamic Cell In Morocco," *The Washington Post*, March 20, 2004 (Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A9282-2004Mar19?language=printer>).
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- ²⁸⁹ Ibid.; "In Depth: Madrid Train Attacks: How the Attacks Happened," BBC News, March 30, 2005 (Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/europe/2004/madrid_train_attacks/default.stm).
- ²⁹⁰ Posner, *Secrets of the Kingdom*, p. 36; Peter Finn, "Hamburg's Caldron of Terror," *The Washington Post*, September 11, 2002 (Available at <http://personal.ecu.edu/conradtd/pols2010/Fall023234/FALL023234030.htm>).
- ²⁹¹ Robert Frank and James Hookway, "Manila Police Say Rebels Have Links to Bin Laden," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 25, 2001 (Available at <http://www.fsu.edu/~wteteach/assets/philip%20links%20to%20bin%20Laden.rtf>).
- ²⁹² "Abu Sayyaf: 'no al Qaeda link'," CNN News, January 27, 2007 (Available at <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/01/21/philippines.militant.reut/>); "Bin Laden's brother-in-law killed," CNN News, January 27, 2007 (Available at <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/01/31/khalifa.death/index.html>).
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- ²⁹⁵ Kaplan, "The Saudi Connection."
- ²⁹⁶ Frank and Hookway, "Manila Police Say Rebels Have Links to Bin Laden."
- ²⁹⁷ Rufi Vigilar, "Abu Sayyaf head hacker surrenders," CNN News, February 21, 2002 (Available at <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/02/21/phil.behead/index.html>); Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, pp. xix-xx; "Rebel Groups Deny Philippines Bomb," BBC News, October 11, 2002 (Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2318819.stm>).
- ²⁹⁸ Bryan Bender, "A changing Qaeda seen on 5 continents," *The Boston Globe*, April 5, 2004 (Available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2004/04/05/a_changing_qaeda_seen_on_5_continents/).
- ²⁹⁹ "Arrested Saudi national is Abu Sayyaf financier – official," Agence France-Presse, January 25, 2005 (Available at http://news.inq7.net/top/index.php?index=1&story_id=25405); Al Jacinto, "Philippines to Deport Saudi," Arab News, January 26, 2005 (Available at <http://www.arabnews.com/?page=4§ion=0&article=58074&d=26&m=1&y=2005>).
- ³⁰⁰ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, p. 245; Maria A. Ressa, "Infiltrating the MILF," *Newsbreak* (Manila), October 28, 2002 (Available at http://www.inq7.net/nwsbrk/2002/oct/28/nbk_1-1.htm).
- ³⁰¹ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, p. 245; Ressa, "Infiltrating the MILF."
- ³⁰² "Madrid Train Station Blasts Kill 190," Fox News, March 11, 2004 (Available at <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,113887,00.html>).
- ³⁰³ "Egyptian, Saudi held in Madrid bomb probe," *The Daily Times* (Reuters), March 17, 2004 (Available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_17-4-2004_pg7_52).
- ³⁰⁴ "Report Examines Madrid Bombing Funds," Associated Press, September 30, 2004 (Available at <http://www.phillyburbs.com/pb-dyn/news/89-09302004-374677.html>).
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- ³⁰⁶ "Report Examines Madrid Bombing Funds," Associated Press.

³⁰⁷ Ibid. Note that some sources spell the name “al-Oadah,” “al-Awdeh” or “al-Awdah” (as in the article cited here).

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Tim Golden and Judith Miller, “Al Qaeda Money Train Runs From Saudi Arabia to Spain,” *The New York Times*, September 21, 2002 (Available at <http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=FA0F17F634540C728EDDA00894DA404482>).

³¹² Testimony of Brisard before the United States Senate, October 22, 2003, p. 16

³¹³ Golden and Miller, “Al Qaeda Money Train Runs From Saudi Arabia to Spain.”

³¹⁴ Golden and Miller, “Al Qaeda Money Train Runs From Saudi Arabia to Spain.” The report continued:
“There was certainly money that came from Saudi Arabia,” a Spanish intelligence official said.
“There was money that was declared openly, and there was money that was on ‘black’ accounts.
Exactly who it came from, we do not yet know.”

Ibid.

³¹⁵ Golden and Miller, “Al Qaeda Money Train Runs From Saudi Arabia to Spain.” See also Daniel Woolis, “Al-Qaida fed on everyday Spanish life,” *Desert News* (Associated Press), January 20, 2004 (Available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20040120/ai_n11442453); Paul Harris and Martin Bright, “Saudi Envoy in UK Linked to 9/11,” *The Observer* (London), March 2, 2003 (Available at <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,905698,00.html>).

³¹⁶ “Treasury Department Statement Regarding the Designation of the Global Relief Foundation,” The United States Department of the Treasury, October 18, 2002 (Available at <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po3553.htm>).

³¹⁷ “Quién es quién en el macrojuicio contra la célula de Al Qaeda,” *El Mundo*, September 25, 2005 (Note that Zouaydi is identified in the article only as “Mohamed Ghaleb,” although he is also clearly identifiable from his photograph.) (Available at <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2005/04/21/espana/1114107834.html>).

According to the above reports, Zouadyi was the financier of an Al Qaeda cell in Spain which was led by a fellow Syrian named Imad Yarkas. Yarkas was also convicted by a Spanish court for his involvement in Al Qaeda and initially sentenced to 27 years (although that was later reduced). One of the major reasons he was given a much stiffer sentence is that Spanish prosecutors were able to show he had foreknowledge of the attacks on September 11. In one wiretapped telephone conversation, just weeks prior to the attacks, Yarkas was told by a London contact that told him he had “entered the field of aviation,” and that “classes were going well.” He then added, “the throat of the bird has been slit.” Ibid.; Craig Whitlock, “Sept. 11 Suspects Go on Trial In Madrid,” *The Washington Post*, April 22, 2005 (Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6642-2005Apr21.html>).

³¹⁸ “Facts & Stats,” online supplement to “Sudan: The Quick and the Terrible,” PBS *Frontline/World*, January 2005 (Available at <http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/sudan/facts.html>).

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ “Foreign Aid,” *Country Studies: Sudan*, The Library of Congress, June 1991 (“After the mid-1970s, Saudi Arabia . . . through its Saudi Development Fund became the largest source of investment capital, apparently convinced that Sudan's development could complement its own, especially in making up its large food deficits.”) (Available at <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/sdtoc.html>).

³²¹ The report further noted the bank’s connection with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Sudan:

The Faisal Islamic Bank enjoyed privileges denied other commercial banks (full tax exemption on assets, profits, wages, and pensions), as well as guarantees against confiscation or nationalization. Moreover, these privileges came under [Pres. Jaafar] Nimeiri’s protection from 1983 onward as he became committed to applying Islamic doctrine to all aspects of Sudanese life.

“Islamic Banking,” *Country Studies: Sudan*, The Library of Congress, June 1991 (Available at <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/sdtoc.html>).

³²² “Relations with Other Arab States,” *Country Studies: Sudan*, The Library of Congress, June 1991 (Available at <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/sdtoc.html>).

³²³ The report went into detail on the military aid Saudi Arabia had provided:

Arab financial assistance, especially from Saudi Arabia, was instrumental in the purchase in 1977 of six C-130 Hercules transport aircraft from the United States, estimated to cost US\$74 million, and two Buffalo transports from Canada. Saudi assistance was also credited for Sudan's acquisition of ten light helicopters and as many as 4,000 vehicles from West Germany. In addition, Saudi Arabia in 1980 supplied the SPAF with seventy used American-built M-41 and M-47 tanks from its reserve inventory.

“Foreign Military Assistance,” *Country Studies: Sudan*, The Library of Congress, June 1991 (Available at <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/sdtoc.html>).

³²⁴ “Sudan: Global Trade, Local Impact,” Human Rights Watch, August 1998 (Available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/sudan/Sudarm988-05.htm#P566_98312).

³²⁵ Morgana Sinclair, “The two sharias: Islamic law is open to interpretation,” *The Weekly Standard*, November 7, 2005 (Available at <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-138813949.html>).

These observations have been echoed by The Library of Congress, which reported, “As of late 2004, some 4 million persons in the South had been internally displaced and more than 2 million had died or been killed as a result of two decades of war.” “Country Profile: Sudan,” Library of Congress – Federal Research Division, December 2004 (Available at <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Sudan.pdf>).

³²⁶ “Saudi - Sudanese agreement on comprehensive cooperation,” ArabicNews.com, November 25, 2002 (Available at <http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/021125/2002112505.html>).

³²⁷ Victoria Bernal, “Migration, Modernity and Islam in Rural Sudan,” *Middle East Report*, No. 211, Summer 1999 (Available at http://www.merip.org/mer/mer211/211_bernal.html).

³²⁸ “WAMY opens 28 new mosques in Sudan,” The Saudi Arabian Information Resource, January 30, 2002; Testimony of Simon Henderson before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, September 10, 2003 (Available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=910&wit_id=2573).

³²⁹ *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), pp. 57, 62-63 (Available at <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>); Damien McElroy, “US forces hunt down al-Qa'eda in Sudan,” *The Telegraph* (London), January 8, 2004 (Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/08/01/wsudan01.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/08/01/ixworld.html>).

³³⁰ Government's Evidentiary Proffer, *United States v. Enaam M. Arnaout*, p. 21.

³³¹ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, p. 43.

³³² David Rennie, “Taliban gold ‘in Sudan’,” *The Telegraph* (London), April 9, 2002 (Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;jsessionid=ZPF200TR00FPFQFIQMGCFF4AVCBQUIV0?xml=/news/2002/09/04/wafg104.xml>).

³³³ Roe, Cohen and Franklin, “How Saudi wealth fueled holy war.”

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ “Al-Hayat: To help in interrogate likely terrorists, a Saudi team arrives in Sudan,” ArabicNews.com, May 31, 2003 (Available at <http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/030531/2003053115.html>).

³³⁶ McElroy, “US forces hunt down al-Qa'eda in Sudan.” See also Craig Whitlock, “Saudis Facing Return of Radicals,” *The New York Times*, July 11, 2004 (“Other Saudis are returning after spending time in newly established training camps across the Red Sea in remote parts of Sudan where central government influence is weak, said a

European intelligence official whose government is advising Saudi officials on their domestic terrorist threat.”) (Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41375-2004Jul10.html>).

³³⁷ Nina Shea, “General Bashir’s Genocide, Again,” *National Review*, June 30, 2004 (Available at <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/she200406300855.asp>).

³³⁸ Michael Slackman, “Bin Laden Says West Is Waging War Against Islam,” *The New York Times*, April 4, 2006 (Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/24/world/middleeast/24binladen.html>).

³³⁹ Ibid. See also Ted Dagne and Bathsheaba Everett, “Sudan: The Darfur Crisis and the Status of the North-South Negotiations,” Congressional Research Service, p. 6 (Available at <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32643.pdf>); “Facts & Stats,” online supplement to “Sudan: The Quick and the Terrible,” PBS *Frontline/World*.

³⁴⁰ “U.S., Saudi Arabia Freeze Assets of Saudi Charity Branch Offices,” U.S. State Department.

³⁴¹ Beyer and MacLeod, “Inside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Ibid.

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³⁴⁵ Sue Pleming, “US says fund flow in from Saudi Arabia to Somalia,” Reuters, June 29, 2006 (Available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2006/06/29/us_says_funds_flow_in_from_saudi_arabia_to_somalia/).

³⁴⁶ Salad Duhul, “2 Somalis killed for watching World Cup,” Associated Press, July 5, 2006 (Available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/1105AP_Somalia_World_Cup.html).

³⁴⁷ “Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology Invade American Mosques,” Center for Religious Freedom, a division of Freedom House, January 28, 2005, pp. 3-4 (Available at <http://crf.hudson.org/files/publications/SaudiPropoganda.pdf>); Caryle Murphy and Susan Schmidt, “U.S. Revokes Visas of 16 at Islamic Institute,” *The Washington Post*, January 29, 2004 (Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A58297-2004Jan28?language=printer>).

³⁴⁸ Ibid; “Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology Invade American Mosques,” Center for Religious Freedom, pp. 3-4.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ Ibid.; Jerry Markon and Susan Schmidt, “Islamic Institute raided in Fairfax,” *The Washington Post*, July 2, 2004 (Available at http://www.archives2004.ghazali.net/html/islamic_institute.html).

³⁵¹ Murphy and Schmidt, “U.S. Revokes Visas of 16 at Islamic Institute.”

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Ottaway, “U.S. Eyes Money Trails of Saudi-Backed Charities.”

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ *The Washington Post* summed up Mohammed’s story and his part in the broader Wahhabi movement:

The collision of Saudi missionary work and suspicions of terrorist financing in San Diego illustrates the perils and provocations of a multibillion-dollar effort by Saudi Arabia to spread its religion around the world. Mohamed worked on the front lines of that effort, a campaign to transform what outsiders call “Wahhabism,” once a marginal and puritanical brand of Islam with few followers outside the Arabian Peninsula, into the dominant doctrine in the Islamic world. The campaign has created a vast infrastructure of both government-supported and private charities that at times has been exploited by violent jihadists – among them Osama bin Laden.

Ottaway, "U.S. Eyes Money Trails of Saudi-Backed Charities."

³⁵⁹ "Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology Invade American Mosques," Center for Religious Freedom, p. 12.

³⁶⁰ Blaine Harden, "Saudis Seek U.S. Muslims for Their Sect," *The New York Times*, October 21, 2001 (Available at <http://www.albany.edu/faculty/lr618/saudis.html>). See also Ottaway, "U.S. Eyes Money Trails of Saudi-Backed Charities" ("Backed by Saudi money, this presence grew rapidly. King Fahd's web site now lists 16 Islamic and cultural centers that the kingdom has helped finance in California, Missouri, Michigan, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Virginia and Maryland. The largest is the King Fahd Mosque in Culver City, a suburb of Los Angeles. The mosque, built with \$8 million in private donations from the king and his son, Crown Prince Abdullah ibn Abdulaziz, was officially inaugurated in 1998 for 2,000 worshippers. It includes a Koranic school, an Islamic research center and a bookstore.")

For a more recent example of Saudi meddling in the U.S., see Jeff Jacoby, "A lawsuit without merit," *The Boston Globe*, June 27, 2007 (Available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/06/27/a_lawsuit_without_merit/).

³⁶¹ Posner, *Secretes of the Kingdom*, p. 173.

³⁶² *9/11 Commission Report*, p. 217; Patrick J. McDonnell, "Saudi Envoy in L.A. Is Deported," *The Los Angeles Times*, May 10, 2003 (Available for fee at <http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/latimes/access/334752081.html?dids=334752081:334752081&FMT=ABS&FMFS=ABS:FT&type=current&date=May+10%2C+2003&author=Patrick+J.+McDonnell&pub=Los+Angeles+Times&edition=&startpage=B.1&desc=Saudi+Envoy+in+L.A.+Is+Deported>); Posner, *Secretes of the Kingdom*, pp. 173, 177

³⁶³ *9/11 Commission Report*, pp. 216-17, 515 n. 13; Graham, *Intelligence Matters*, p. 12.

³⁶⁴ See generally Testimony of Levitt before the United States Senate, September 10, 2003; "The journey of Haroun Fazul," online supplement to "Saudi Time Bomb?," PBS *Frontline*, original airdate November 15, 2001 (Available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/fazul/>); "Ethiopian Journalist on the Detrimental Effects of Saudi Arabia's 'Poisonous Wahhabism' on His Country," The Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch No. 624, December 9, 2003 (Available at <http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP62403>); Ottaway, "U.S. Eyes Money Trails of Saudi-Backed Charities"; Sofia Celeste and Farah Stockman, "Alleged CIA target tied to Iraq group: Italian official details imam case," *The Boston Globe*, June 27, 2005 (Available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2005/06/27/alleged_cia_target_tied_to_iraq/?rss_id=Boston+Globe+--+Front+Page); "Additional Al-Haramain Branches, Former Leader Designated by Treasury as Al Qaida Supporters: Treasury Marks Latest Action in Joint Designation with Saudi Arabia," United States Department of the Treasury, June 2, 2004 (Available at <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1703.htm>); Jonathan Wells, Jack Meyers and Maggie Mulvihill, "Saudi Elite Linked to bin Laden Financial Empire," *The Boston Herald*, October 14, 2001 (Available at <http://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2001/bostonherald101401.html>); "Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing," Independent Task Force of Terrorist Financing Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, June 15, 2004, p. 21-22.

³⁶⁵ Schwartz, "Saudi Mischief in Fallujah." Former counter-terrorism czar Richard Clarke has also described how this effort has played itself out on an international level:

Little noticed by most Americans, including in its government, a new international movement began growing during the last two decades. It does not just seek terror for its own sake; that international movement's goal is the creation of a network of governments, imposing on their citizens a minority interpretation of Islam. Some in the movement call for the scope of their campaign to be global domination. The "Caliphate" they seek to create would be a severe and repressive fourteenth-century literalist theocracy. They pursue its creation with gruesome violence and fear.

Similarly, Abdurrahman Wahid, the former president of Indonesia, has warned that, "In recent decades, Wahhabi/Salafi ideology has made substantial inroads throughout the Muslim world."

Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (New York: Free Press, 2004), p. 35; "Saudi Arabia's Curriculum of Intolerance: With Excerpts from Saudi Ministry of Education Textbooks for Islamic

Studies,” Center for Religious Freedom, a division of Freedom House, with the Institute of Gulf Affairs, May 2006, p. 17-18 (Available at http://crf.hudson.org/files/publications/CRF_SaudiReport_2006.pdf).

³⁶⁶ Regarding the February 22, 2006, bombing of the 1,200-year-old Askariya Mosque (the “Golden Mosque”) in Samarra which nearly ignited a civil war, see “Over 100 killed after Iraq mosque attack,” CBS News, February 23, 2006 (Available at http://cbs4.com/national/topstories_story_054083831.html). Regarding the assassination of Sunni tribal leaders, see Paul Tait, “Six tribal leaders among 50 killed in Iraq,” Reuters, June 26, 2007 (Available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSCOL02152020070626?feedType=RSS>); “Baghdad blast kills Sunni leaders,” BBC News, June 25, 2007 (Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6236494.stm);

³⁶⁷ David I. McKeeby, “Iraq Marks Two Years of Sovereignty, Progress,” United States Department of State, June 29, 2006 (available at <http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=June&x=20060629175517idybeekcm0.6138727>); Kim Gamel, “Suspect in Iraq shrine bombing captured,” Associated Press, June 28, 2006 (Available at <http://kxmb.com/getArticle.asp?ArticleId=18856>); “Insurgents Demand Withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Iraq in 2 Years,” Fox News (Associated Press), dated June 28, 2006 (Available at <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,201295,00.html>).

³⁶⁸ Testimony of Emerson and Levin before the United States Senate, July 31, 2003.

³⁶⁹ Ibid. Note also that this certainly seems to corroborate the claims of Saudi dissident Ali al-Ahmed, who described the Wahhabi view as so extreme that they consider 95% of all Muslims to be impostors, as discussed in the previous report.